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Abstract: Corporate tax avoidance is a pressing issue of both national and in-
ternational concern. Corporations usually claim that they are legally required 
to engage in aggressive tax strategies. But this Article proves that claim is in-
correct when based upon the fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and its 
stockholders. Directors and other corporate managers often look to the classic 
case of Dodge v. Ford, which is ubiquitous in corporate law from the board-
room to the courtroom, as a North Star that guides them toward and defines 
their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stockholders. In Dodge, the 
court held, “A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for 
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed 
for that end.” This holding has been interpreted by many directors and other 
corporate managers not only as a decree to relentlessly seek profit, but also as 
an absolute edict to maximize profits, even if it means hurting society, damag-
ing the environment, or destroying anything standing in the corporation’s 
path. The problem is that this interpretation of the Dodge mandate is wrong. 
The mandate requires only that directors and other corporate managers run the 
corporation “primarily for the profit of the stockholders,” leaving room for 
other secondary considerations. Beyond that, many limitations on the Dodge 
mandate exist, including the business judgment rule, which gives directors 
and other corporate managers substantial discretion in running the corpora-
tion. The Dodge mandate, while offering general guidance as to how a corpo-
ration should be run, i.e. “primarily for the profit of the stockholders,” utterly 
fails to offer guidance in assessing any specific analysis. As a result, other 
doctrines are needed to fill this gap. This Article discusses some of the doc-
trines, including corporate social responsibility, sustainability, and economics, 
that should be employed to protect society from the damage that tax avoid-
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ance can create. It concludes that while some minimal amount of tax avoid-
ance may be acceptable, very aggressive forms of tax avoidance should be 
avoided. 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 6, 2016, the United States Department of Justice filed a sum-
mons enforcement proceeding in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California to compel Facebook, Inc. to comply with an 
ongoing Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigation relating to the alleged 
undervaluation of property transferred to an Irish subsidiary as part of a tax 
avoidance scheme.1 Although the audit year involved was 2010, this filing 
provided the first public notice of this investigation.2 The scheme, common-
ly referred to as a “double Irish strategy” because it involves the creation of 
two Irish subsidiaries, allows United States corporations to take advantage 
of Ireland’s 12.5% corporate tax rate, which is substantially lower than the 
corporate tax rate in the United States.3 The IRS was specifically concerned 
with the undervaluation of assets transferred from Facebook to the Irish 
subsidiary for purposes of setting up the scheme.4 According to a disclosure 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Seth Fiegerman, Facebook Is Being Investigated by the IRS, CNN (July 7, 2016, 12:43 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/07/technology/facebook-irs-investigation/?iid=EL [https://perma.cc/
4L4B-GNEY] (“The U.S. Justice Department filed a petition in court on [July 6th] to force Face-
book . . . to comply with an ongoing IRS investigation into whether the company significantly 
understated the value of property transferred to an Ireland subsidiary as part of a complex maneu-
ver to reduce its tax payments.”). 
 2 See Seth Fiegerman, Facebook Could Owe $5 Billion in Taxes, CNN (July 29, 2016, 2:17 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/29/technology/facebook-irs-penalty/index.html [https://perma.cc/
4WN6-TDF8] (“The tax issue was first disclosed publicly [on July 6th] when the U.S. Justice 
Department filed a lawsuit forcing Facebook to comply with the ongoing IRS investigation.”). 
 3 See Richard Lyal, Transfer Pricing Rules and State Aid, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1017, 1023 
(2015) (“Among tax planners, Ireland is well known as a base for the technique called ‘double 
Irish,’ which exploits mismatches in the tax treatment of companies that are incorporated in Ire-
land but not resident there for tax purposes.”); Chris William Sanchirico, As American as Apple 
Inc.: International Tax and Ownership Nationality, 68 TAX L. REV. 207, 207–09 (2015) (“Em-
ploying a multi-layered configuration of foreign subsidiaries—in a structure known as the ‘double 
Irish, Dutch sandwich’—banner U.S. companies like Apple, Cisco, and Google have significantly 
reduced their global tax bills by shifting profitable aspects of their businesses to low-tax coun-
tries.”); Stephen C. Loomis, Recent Development, The Double Irish Sandwich: Reforming Over-
seas Tax Havens, 43 ST. MARY’S L.J. 825, 836–39 (2012) (providing a “walkthrough” of the 
“double Irish” tax strategy that some large multinational corporations use to reduce their tax liabil-
ity). Ireland has taken steps to end this controversial tax avoidance scheme. See Death of the Dou-
ble Irish, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-
finance/21625444-irish-government-has-announced-plans-alter-one-its-more-controversial-tax-
policies [https://perma.cc/24C2-GJXZ] (discussing the Irish government’s reforms designed to 
eliminate the “double Irish” tax avoidance scheme). 
 4 See Deepa Seetharaman, IRS Wants Facebook’s Records on Transfer of Assets to Ireland, 
WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2016, 5:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/irs-wants-facebooks-records-
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that Facebook filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, the penalty leveled by the IRS, which Facebook plans to contest, 
could range from between three billion to five billion dollars plus interest.5 
Although the question of the legality of Facebook’s behavior is an in-
teresting one,6 the deeper question is whether the law requires Facebook’s 
corporate management and corporate managers in general to engage in ag-
gressive tax avoidance strategies. This is a question that directors and other 
corporate managers face daily, and they would almost certainly answer in 
the affirmative based upon the fiduciary duties they perceive that they owe 
to the corporation and its stockholders. Remarkably, they are wrong. This 
Article explores whether directors’ fiduciary duties require them to engage 
in aggressive tax avoidance strategies. Although surprising to many manag-
ers, the law surrounding these duties dictates no such thing. 
Directors and other corporate managers often look to the classic case 
of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. as a North Star, guiding them toward and de-
fining their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stockholders.7 This 
case is ubiquitous in corporate law, from finding its way into the majority of 
leading textbooks to being implemented in boardrooms and courtrooms 
throughout the United States.8 In Dodge, the Supreme Court of Michigan 
                                                                                                                           
on-transfer-of-assets-to-ireland-1467923716 (“U.S. tax officials sued Facebook Inc. to force the 
company to hand over documents related [to] a transfer of assets to Ireland in 2010, part of a 
yearslong investigation into whether some of those assets were undervalued . . . .”). 
 5 Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 19 (July 28, 2016) (“On July 27, 2016, we 
received a Statutory Notice of Deficiency (Notice) from the IRS relating to transfer pricing with 
our foreign subsidiaries in conjunction with the examination of the 2010 tax year . . . . [that] could 
result in an additional federal tax liability of an estimated aggregate amount of approximately 
$3.0–$5.0 billion, plus interest and any penalties asserted.”). 
 6 To be crystal clear, the authors of this Article take no position in this Article on the legality 
and propriety of Facebook’s alleged actions. 
 7 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (discussing the duties of directors to corporations and their 
shareholders). 
 8 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Govern-
ance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 575 (2003) (“Dodge’s theory of shareholder wealth maximization 
has been widely accepted by courts over an extended period of time.”); Miriam A. Cherry & Judd 
F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After 
the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 1016 (2011) (“Although subsequent courts have not 
relied much on Dodge’s authority, the case and its statement of shareholder primacy have taken on 
lives of their own in law school casebooks, in the academic literature, and in the minds and hearts 
of American businesspeople. In fact, in large part due to Dodge, American corporate culture has 
embraced shareholder primacy and profit maximization as norms.”); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an 
Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social En-
terprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221, 239–40 (2012) (“Scholars and 
courts express a director’s fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of a corporation as a duty to 
prioritize the shareholders’ interests over interests of other constituencies or to maximize share-
holder wealth. A frequently cited case espousing the shareholder wealth maximization norm is 
Dodge . . . .”). 
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held, “A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed 
for that end.”9 This holding, which the authors of this Article will refer to as 
the “Dodge mandate,” has been interpreted by many directors and other 
corporate managers not only as a decree to relentlessly seek profit, but as an 
absolute edict to maximize profits, even if it means hurting society, damag-
ing the environment, or destroying anything standing in the corporation’s 
path.10 
The problem is that this interpretation of the Dodge mandate is incor-
rect. The mandate requires only that directors and other corporate managers 
run the corporation “primarily for the profit of the stockholders,” which 
leaves room for other considerations.11 Beyond that, many limitations on 
the Dodge mandate exist, including, for example, the business judgment 
rule, which grants directors and other corporate managers substantial discre-
tion in running the corporation.12 In addition, relatively new constituency 
statutes, which have been enacted in a majority of jurisdictions, allow cor-
porate management to consider a wider range of interests beyond just seek-
ing profits for the corporation and its stockholders.13 Moreover, the initial 
drafting and potential subsequent amendment of the articles of incorpora-
tion and the bylaws, along with seeking approval and ratification by stock-
holders and directors, provide other avenues to limiting the Dodge man-
date.14 
In short, while the Dodge mandate remains true in general, it provides 
scant guidance in specific matters because the limitations placed upon it 
                                                                                                                           
 9 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
 10 See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Beyond Insolvency, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2013) (“The 
managerial ideal described in Dodge and similar cases is that of shareholder-wealth maximization 
. . . . On the traditional view, managers deciding how to employ firm assets ought to privilege the 
common shareholders over competing constituencies.”); Keith William Diener, The Restricted 
Nature of the Profit Motive: Perspectives from Law, Business, and Economics, 30 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 225, 237 (2016) (“The 1919 Michigan Supreme Court case of Dodge v. 
Ford is often cited as the basis for a legal obligation to maximize shareholder wealth.”); Regina 
Robson, A New Look at Benefit Corporations: Game Theory and Game Changer, 52 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 501, 509 (2015) (“[T]he Dodge court provided a legal sound bite for the concept that came to 
be known as profit maximization, and its corollary, shareholder primacy . . . .”). 
 11 See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
 12 See infra notes 178–203 and accompanying text (discussing the business judgment rule as a 
limitation upon the Dodge mandate). 
 13 See infra notes 212–222 and accompanying text (describing constituency statutes as a limi-
tation upon the Dodge mandate). 
 14 See infra notes 204–211 and accompanying text (analyzing stockholder and director ap-
proval and ratification as a limitation upon the Dodge mandate); infra notes 223–228 (describing 
the initial drafting and potential subsequent amendment of articles of incorporation and corporate 
bylaws as a possible limitation upon the Dodge mandate). 
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give broad discretion in how profit may be sought. In the past decade, at 
least one leading commentator has argued that Dodge ought to be ignored 
altogether, and that a better, more wholesome, and comprehensive under-
standing of the corporation ought to emerge.15 The debate over teaching 
Dodge rages on and is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. Regardless, the 
Dodge mandate will loom large over the corporate law landscape for dec-
ades, perhaps even centuries, to come. 
Currently, a gap exists in the tax law scholarship regarding the applica-
tion of the Dodge mandate, and the fiduciary duties that underlie it, to tax 
avoidance strategies. While substantial legal and ethical literature exists 
exploring the metes and bounds of fiduciary duties in the corporate context, 
this literature has not been applied to questions of tax avoidance. This gap 
in the applied literature is particularly relevant today because tax avoidance 
is currently one of the most significant legal questions for corporations. As 
the public observes corporations engaging in increasingly more aggressive 
tax practices, such as inversions, offshoring intellectual property, intercom-
pany loans, transferring pricing schemes, non-repatriation of income, and 
even secret tax deals with tax havens, the public has become increasingly 
concerned that corporations are not fairly and fully contributing taxes to the 
nations in which they do business.16 
In defense of highly aggressive tax strategies, directors and other cor-
porate managers often point to Dodge.17 They suggest that the Dodge 
mandate not only gives them permission to engage in these tax prac-
tices, but actually demands that they do so. This suggestion is incor-
rect. Rather than serving as a North Star in the area of tax avoidance, 
the Dodge mandate and the limitations placed upon it, if properly under-
stood, should leave directors and other corporate managers wandering and 
unsure of how to proceed. 
This Article argues that employing a broader range of doctrines, includ-
ing doctrines from the fields of corporate social responsibility, sustainability, 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 
163, 166 (2008) (“This Essay argues that Dodge v. Ford is indeed bad law, at least when cited for 
the proposition that the corporate purpose is, or should be, maximizing shareholder wealth.”). 
 16 See Tracy A. Kaye, The Offshore Shell Game: U.S. Corporate Tax Avoidance Through 
Profit Shifting, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 185, 185 (2014) (“[T]he public is becoming increasingly aware 
of the corporate tax avoidance issue. In fact, there is global concern that U.S. multinationals are 
using transfer pricing rules and other techniques to shift reported income to low-tax countries 
. . . .”); Michelle D. Layser, Improving Tax Incentives for Wind Energy Production: The Case for 
a Refundable Production Tax Credit, 81 MO. L. REV. 453, 515 (2016) (“[M]any members of the 
public are undoubtedly frustrated by stories of large corporate taxpayers that escape significant tax 
liability through aggressive tax planning strategies . . . .”). 
 17 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
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and economics, is necessary for determining when tax avoidance is permissi-
ble.18 This Article ultimately concludes that no general legal duty to engage in 
tax avoidance exists, and, as a result, a broader conception of the corporation 
is needed. This conclusion, of course, challenges the popular shareholder 
primacy model of the corporation, a model that, similar to Dodge, seems to 
be more of a historical artifact with each passing year. 
This Article supplements the existing scholarship in three main ways. 
First, this Article fills the gap in the existing scholarship regarding the ap-
plication of the Dodge mandate and fiduciary duties to tax avoidance. Such 
a discussion is particularly timely considering how regularly tax avoidance 
issues continue to arise. Second, this Article provides an analysis of how the 
Dodge mandate should apply to tax avoidance in light of recent scholarship 
challenging the worth, scope, and validity of that mandate.19 Such scholar-
ship has demanded a more nuanced understanding of Dodge. This Article 
offers that more nuanced understanding and applies it to the complex issues 
surrounding tax avoidance strategies to demonstrate that the Dodge man-
date fails to offer a solution to these issues. Third, in light of the failure of 
the Dodge mandate to offer definitive answers as to when corporate man-
agement should engage in tax avoidance strategies, this Article offers other 
doctrines that might be used as guiding principles to fill that void. 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part I explores 
the nature of corporate tax avoidance, including contrasting tax avoidance 
and tax evasion, discussing the importance of tax avoidance and tax mini-
mization to corporations, and exploring the negative externalities that tax 
avoidance generates.20 Part II explores the Dodge mandate and how it 
emerges from the fiduciary duties that directors and other corporate manag-
ers owe to the corporation and its stockholders.21 Part III explores the sub-
stantial limitations that are placed upon that mandate, including the business 
judgment rule, the possibility of stockholder and director approval and rati-
fication of non-profit-seeking behavior, constituency statutes, and the ability 
of articles of incorporation and bylaws to limit the Dodge mandate.22 Part 
IV provides and explains case law supporting the argument that the Dodge 
mandate does not legally require companies to engage in aggressive tax 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 252–289 and accompanying text (discussing various doctrines that may 
provide guidance in tax avoidance matters). 
 19 See infra notes 169–177 (discussing the continued importance of the Dodge mandate de-
spite criticisms). See generally Stout, supra note 15 (criticizing the worth, scope, and validity of 
Dodge). 
 20 See infra notes 25–67 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 68–162 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 163–228 and accompanying text. 
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avoidance strategies.23 This Part also explores various fields that provide 
guidance in tax avoidance decision making in the absence of a legal re-
quirement that firms engage in aggressive tax avoidance strategies, includ-
ing corporate social responsibility, sustainability, and economics.24 Finally, 
the Conclusion offers brief closing remarks. 
Ultimately, this Article concludes that the negative externalities of tax 
avoidance are not merely an issue of individual rights, individual action, 
and individual consequences. Tax avoidance is a behavior that pushes off 
the costs of a firm’s tax avoidance onto society, the business community, 
and a firm’s culture. The Dodge mandate, while offering general guidance 
as to how a corporation should be run—that is, “primarily for the profit of 
the stockholders”—utterly fails to offer guidance in assessing any specific 
analysis. As a result, other doctrines are needed to resolve these issues. This 
Article discusses some of those doctrines, including corporate social re-
sponsibility, sustainability, and economics, that should be employed to pro-
tect society from the damage that tax avoidance can create. It concludes that 
while some minimal amount of tax avoidance may be acceptable, overly 
aggressive forms of tax avoidance should be avoided. 
I. EXPLORING CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE 
A. Defining Tax Avoidance 
Corporate tax avoidance has emerged as an issue of both national and 
international concern; however, aggressively seeking to minimize one’s tax-
es is not a new concept.25 The extent to which one can and should minimize 
taxes has spawned disagreement for many, many decades, if not longer.26 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See infra notes 229–251 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 252–289 and accompanying text. 
 25 See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank & Nancy Staudt, Corporate Shams, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1641, 
1648 (2012) (“In the earliest forms of corporate tax abuse, corporations deployed relatively simple 
strategies to obtain beneficial tax results. . . . [C]orporations would frequently try to eliminate 
corporate taxation by disguising payments to shareholders as items that generated tax deductions, 
such as rental or salary payments, even though in reality such payments to shareholders constitut-
ed nondeductible dividends. Other corporations attempted to manipulate the characterization of 
their tax years by exploiting differences between the calendar year and their fiscal year.”); David 
A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 215–17 (2002). 
 26 See Zoë Prebble & John Prebble, The Morality of Tax Avoidance, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
693, 716 (2010) (“The cases have not provided any principled reason for us to believe that taxpay-
ers are morally entitled to avoid tax. There have been judicial pronouncements on both sides of the 
debate on the morality of tax avoidance.”); Anthony B. Casarona, Comment, Regulating Corpo-
rate Tax Shelters: Seeking Certainty in a Complex World, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 111, 130–31 
(2000) (“The rules promulgated to counter corporate tax shelters are inadequate because they fail 
to provide a clear standard to consistently or predictably judge alleged abuses. . . . [S]ubstantial 
disagreement remains concerning the distinction between abusive tax avoidance schemes and 
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While the issue persists, it becomes more salient to the public when large 
corporations grab headlines with their actions. In recent years, the tax strate-
gies of Starbucks,27 Apple,28 Pfizer,29 and numerous other corporations have 
reminded the public that firms often undertake highly aggressive tax strate-
gies to minimize their corporate taxes. When the public is reminded, tax 
avoidance strategies draw considerable public scorn. In a March 2015 Pew 
opinion poll, sixty four percent of Americans surveyed indicated that “they 
are bothered a lot by the feeling that some corporations [do not pay their fair 
share of taxes].”30 
Notably, recent news reports about the tax strategies of Starbucks, Ap-
ple, and Pfizer have not alleged legal violations; rather, the reports have 
alleged highly aggressive tax avoidance.31 Still, as the Pew opinion poll in-
dicates, concerns persist. 
Corporate tax avoidance can be defined as structuring business transac-
tions to reduce a firm’s tax obligations in a manner that technically complies 
with the law, but violates the spirit or underlying policy of the law.32 Avoid-
                                                                                                                           
legitimate tax planning.”); see also Elena Marty-Nelson, Taxing Reciprocal Trusts: Chartering a 
Doctrine’s Fall from Grace, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1781, 1811 (1997) (“Creative taxpayers can and do 
arrange their transactions so as to minimize the applicable tax consequences, and there is little 
disagreement that such stratagems within the system are acceptable. However, somewhere in the 
continuum, otherwise acceptable machinations rise to a level of manipulation that cannot be toler-
ated without jeopardizing the integrity of the taxing scheme.”). 
 27 See generally Edward D. Kleinbard, Through a Latte, Darkly: Starbucks’ Stateless Income 
Planning, 139 TAX NOTES 1515 (June 24, 2013) (discussing the controversy surrounding the 
Starbucks Corporation’s use of aggressive tax avoidance strategies). 
 28 See generally Danny Yadron et al., Apple Avoided Taxes on Overseas Billions, Senate 
Panel Finds, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2013, 7:02 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412
7887324787004578495250424727708 (reporting on the Senate investigation into Apple’s tax 
avoidance strategies). 
 29 See generally James Surowiecki, Why Firms Are Fleeing, NEW YORKER (Jan. 11, 2016), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/01/11/why-firms-are-fleeing [https://perma.cc/4EER-
46NB] (noting Pfizer’s attempted corporate inversion as a tax avoidance mechanism). 
 30 Seth Motel, 5 Facts on How Americans View Taxes, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 10, 2015), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/10/5-facts-on-how-americans-view-taxes/ [https://perma.
cc/62RC-KH5J]. 
 31 See Kleinbard, supra note 27; Surowiecki; supra note 29; Yadron et al., supra note 28. 
 32 See Prebble & Prebble, supra note 26, at 702–03 (“Tax avoidance is not illegal. Rather, it is 
the act of taking advantage of legal opportunities to minimize one’s tax liability. Lord Nolan and 
Lord Hoffman separately captured the essence of avoidance in these passages: ‘The hallmark of 
tax avoidance is that the taxpayer reduces his liability to tax without incurring the economic con-
sequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by any taxpayer qualifying for such reduction in 
his tax liability . . . . [T]ransactions which in commercial terms fall within the charge to tax but 
have been, intentionally or otherwise, structured in such a way that on a purely juristic analysis 
they do not. This is what is meant by defeating the intention and application of the statute.’”); see 
also Michelle Hanlon & Shane Heitzman, A Review of Tax Research, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 127, 
137 (2010) (“If tax avoidance represents a continuum of tax planning strategies where something 
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ance is distinguishable from evasion by the legality of the action.33 Tax 
avoidance, for example, is not implicated when taxpayers purchase single 
family homes and use the home mortgage interest deduction. Such an eco-
nomic transaction is consistent with congressional intent.34 Tax avoidance 
occurs when economic transactions are structured to achieve tax results con-
trary to those that should typically occur.35 For example, tax avoidance occurs 
when U.S.-based firms offshore their intellectual property to a controlled Irish 
company to take advantage of the low Irish tax rate, while making no other 
organizational changes and keeping the benefits of ostensibly remaining a 
U.S.-based firm.36 Tax avoidance also occurs when a U.S.-based firm inten-
tionally leaves foreign-earned profits offshore to avoid U.S. taxation while 
simultaneously using a series of short-term, inter-company loans to gain on-
shore use of the profits.37 Further, tax avoidance occurs when firms create, 
within a low-tax jurisdiction, a related subsidiary in its supply chain and em-
ploy artificially high/low transfer pricing to shift earnings from a high-tax 
jurisdiction to a lower-tax jurisdiction.38 
                                                                                                                           
like municipal bond investments are at one end, . . . then terms such as ‘noncompliance,’ ‘eva-
sion,’ ‘aggressiveness,’ and ‘sheltering’ would be closer to the other end of the continuum.”). 
 33 See Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 62 NAT’L 
TAX J. 727, 727 (2009) (“Tax avoidance is sometimes used to refer to a legal reduction in taxes, 
while evasion refers to tax reductions that are illegal. . . . A multinational firm that constructs a 
factory in a low-tax country rather than in the United States to take advantage of low corporate tax 
rates and deferral of U.S. tax is engaged in avoidance, while a U.S. citizen who sets up a secret 
bank account in the Caribbean and does not report the interest income is engaged in evasion. 
Many activities, particularly by corporations, often referred to as avoidance, could be classified as 
evasion. One example is transfer pricing, where firms charge low prices for sales to low-tax affili-
ates but pay high prices for purchases from them. If these prices, which should be at arms-length, 
are set artificially to reduce total taxes paid, this activity might be viewed as evasion, even if such 
pricing is not overturned in court because evidence is lacking.”). 
 34 See MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41596, THE MORTGAGE INTEREST 
AND PROPERTY TAX DEDUCTIONS: ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS 3–5 (2014) (noting the history of the 
home mortgage interest deduction). 
 35 See Prebble & Prebble, supra note 26, at 702–03 (describing tax avoidance). 
 36 See, e.g., Jennifer DePaul, Advocacy Group Urges Etsy to Change Tax Structure, 148 TAX 
NOTES 1079, 1079–80 (Sept. 7, 2015) (noting critiques of Etsy’s use of an Irish subsidiary); Suzanne 
Kapner, Etsy Faces Pressure to Abandon Irish Tax Strategy, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2015, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/etsy-faces-pressure-to-abandon-irish-tax-strategy-1441080008 (discuss-
ing Etsy’s transfer of intellectual property to an Irish subsidiary and the tax consquences). 
 37 See, e.g., Andrew Velarde, Will Wal-Mart’s Short-Term Loan Plan Drive Change?, 148 
TAX NOTES 123, 123–25 (July 13, 2015) (noting Wal-Mart’s use of short-term loans to transfer 
profits from a foreign subsidiary). 
 38 See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 27 at 1522–29 (noting Starbucks’ use of affiliates, royal-
ties, licensing fees, transfer pricing, and inter-firm loans to avoid taxation); Richard Murphy, 
Opinion, Amazon, Google and Starbucks Are Struggling to Defend Their Tax Avoidance, GUARD-
IAN (Nov. 13, 2012, 7:47 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/nov/13/amazon-
google-starbucks-tax-avoidance (critiquing transfer pricing practices). 
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While some decry these corporate actions,39 others defend them as ei-
ther legally required, accepted business practices, or both. President Donald 
Trump has claimed that he has a “fiduciary responsibility to his busi-
ness . . . to pay no more tax than legally required.”40 Senator Rand Paul has 
suggested that “[a] corporate executive would be fired if he or she passed 
up known ways to reduce taxes.”41 Even the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) tax director acknowledges that 
“tax planning [has] become part of core business models.”42 These state-
ments are indicative of two business realities: first, the belief that tax avoid-
ance is acceptable and pervasive in business, and, second, that managers 
perceive they must engage in this behavior, either due to peer pressure or a 
belief that their fiduciary duties require it. 
B. The Attraction of Tax Avoidance to the Corporation and Its Managers 
Corporations engage in tax avoidance because it is lucrative.43 The ac-
counting literature refers to tax avoidance as a value-creating activity.44 The 
OECD estimates that multinational firms engage in up to $240 billion of tax 
avoidance annually, which is the equivalent of ten percent of global corpo-
                                                                                                                           
 39 See New York Times Editorial Board, Editorial, Pfizer’s Big Breakthrough: Global Tax 
Avoidance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/opinion/pfizers-
big-breakthrough-global-tax-avoidance.html (“The $160 billion deal to combine Pfizer and Aller-
gan, the maker of Botox, does not appear to be illegal. But it should be. This merger is a tax-
dodging maneuver that enriches shareholders and executives while shortchanging the public and 
robbing the Treasury of money that would pay for a host of government programs—including 
education, scientific research and other services that also benefit corporations. . . . Reincorporating 
abroad is a sophisticated variation on the old practice of avoiding corporate taxes by renting a post 
office box in the Caribbean and calling it corporate headquarters. Congress put a stop to those 
tactics in 2004. It is past time to shut down inversions as well.”). 
 40 See Sabri Ben-Achour, Trump: The Law Made Me Do It, MARKETPLACE (Oct. 4, 2016, 4:31 
PM), http://www.marketplace.org/2016/10/04/world/trump-law-made-me-do-it [https://perma.cc/
626G-YRPD] (quoting a Trump campaign statement). 
 41 Danny Yadron et al., Apple’s Cook Defends Tax Practices as Proper, WALL ST. J. (May 
21, 2013, 11:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323648304578496963468
168822 (quoting Senator Rand Paul).  
 42 Simon Bowers, OECD Hopes Tax Reforms Will End Era of Aggressive Avoidance, GUARD-
IAN, (Oct. 5, 2015, 1:19 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/05/oecd-hopes-
reforms-will-end-era-of-aggressive-tax-avoidance [https://perma.cc/Q4NB-C6WN] (quoting OECD 
tax director Pascal Saint-Amans). 
 43 See Henry Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 47, 47 (2010) 
(“Tax planners, like deal planners, ‘add value’ as they provide their legal and accounting ser-
vices.”). 
 44 See Bradley S. Blaylock, Is Tax Avoidance Associated with Economically Significant Rent 
Extraction Among U.S. Firms?, 33 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1013, 1015 (2016) (“Consistent with 
Rego (2003) and with the view that tax avoidance is generally a value creating activity, I consist-
ently find that two of three tax-avoidance proxies are positively associated with future perfor-
mance . . . .”). 
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rate tax revenues.45 The United States portion of these losses is astounding: 
the Congressional Research Service estimates United States tax revenue 
losses at one hundred billion dollars due to tax avoidance.46 
Larger and more international firms appear to be more successful at 
tax avoidance than smaller and/or domestic firms. One scholar has empiri-
cally demonstrated that larger firms with more income have greater incen-
tives and are more likely to have the available resources to utilize aggres-
sive tax avoidance strategies.47 To this point, a recent study indicated that 
seventy-three percent of Fortune 500 companies use tax havens.48 While 
some might argue that the mere existence of a subsidiary within a known 
tax haven jurisdiction is not evidence of tax avoidance, the underlying data 
shows otherwise: 
American multinational companies collectively reported 43 per-
cent of their foreign earnings in five small tax haven countries: 
Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzer-
land. Yet these countries accounted for only 4 percent of the com-
panies’ foreign workforces and just 7 percent of their foreign in-
vestments. By contrast, American multinationals reported earning 
just 14 percent of their profits in major U.S. trading partners with 
higher taxes—Australia, Canada, the UK, Germany, and Mexi-
co—which accounted for 40 percent of their foreign workforce 
and 34 percent of their foreign investment.49 
American firms record “profits” from Bermuda and the Caymans that are 
more than ten times the total annual output these islands claim to have.50 
These statistics are indicative of widespread, high-dollar corporate tax 
avoidance. 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Taxing Multinational Enterprises, Base Erosion and Profits Shifting (BEPS), POLICY 
BRIEF (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Paris, France) Oct. 2015, at 1, http://www.oecd.org/
policy-briefs/PB-Base-Erosion-Profit-Shifting-(BEPS-III)-Oct-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY9E-
R8ZJ] (providing an estimate of the cost of tax avoidance).  
 46 See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL 
TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 1 (2015) (estimating the effect of tax avoidance on tax revenues). 
 47 See Sonja Olhoft Rego, Tax-Avoidance Activities of U.S. Multinational Corporations, 20 
CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 805, 812–13, 828 (2003) (concluding that firms with greater pre-tax in-
come avoid more income taxes than other firms). 
 48 Richard Phillips et al., Offshore Shell Games 2016: The Use of Offshore Tax Havens by 
Fortune 500 Companies 1 (2016), http://ctj.org/pdf/offshoreshellgames2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GK7K-NT7P]. 
 49 Id. at 6 (citing a 2013 Congressional Research Service Report). 
 50 Id. at 1. 
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Significant literature also exists discussing the relationship between 
stockholders and managers,51 and in particular, when their interests are 
aligned and when managers act to further their own interests.52 While 
stockholders likely do not object to the increased returns that tax avoidance 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (describing and developing 
agency theory, which includes the relationship and interests amongst stockholders and managers); 
see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 287 (1999) (“[M]ost contemporary corporate scholars tend to assume that direc-
tors’ proper role is to maximize the economic interests of the corporation’s shareholders. Recent 
years, however, have seen the rise of a second, opposing camp of theorists known as ‘communitar-
ians’ or ‘progressives.’ These scholars object to shareholder primacy on normative grounds, and 
argue that directors ought to be required to run corporations with due regard for the interests of 
other potential stakeholders such as employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, or the local com-
munity.”); David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 149 (2013) (“Corporate management (the board and the execu-
tive officers it hires) is today widely assumed to derive its authority from the shareholders, who, as 
owners, authorize it. The argument so far shows this cannot be correct, because shareholders do 
not own the corporation. Shareholders do have a nominal right to select who occupies the seats on 
the board of directors; however, as I now argue, neither the office of director nor its authority 
derives from them, but from the state, via the corporate charter.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Con-
cept That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. 
L. 819, 832 (1998) (“Most (although by no means all) corporate scholars subscribe to the norm of 
shareholder primacy, under which the objective of the corporation’s management should be to 
increase shareholder wealth, within the constraints of law and morality. This view is not uncontro-
versial. In particular, many corporate scholars take a communitarian view, under which the board 
should manage the corporation in the interests of all actors who have an interest in or reciprocal 
arrangements with the corporation, including not only shareholders but employees, creditors, cus-
tomers, suppliers, and the community.”); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorpora-
tion and the Unraveling of “Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1135 (2011) 
(“On a fundamental level, corporations all share the same governance characteristics. The firm is 
controlled by a board of directors, who in turn select the officers who run the day-to-day business 
of the operation. This board is elected by shareholders. The shareholders share in the profits of the 
corporation through dividends and can sell their shares on the open market. This same basic struc-
ture—shareholders elect directors who appoint officers—can be found in every public corpora-
tion.”). 
 52 See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1907 (2013) (reflecting on when and why the interests of shareholders align and differ from those 
of managers); see also Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and 
the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1171–72 (2013) 
(“[M]anagerial capitalism worked surprisingly well for dispersed and powerless shareholders. To 
understand why, it is important to recognize that while neither state nor federal law requires direc-
tors to use their corporate powers to maximize shareholder wealth, it does prevent them from 
using their powers to maximize their own. The doctrine known as the business judgment rule 
allows disinterested directors and executives to sacrifice corporate profits to pursue any lawful 
corporate objective, including creating good jobs, providing quality products, and protecting credi-
tors. But the duty of loyalty ensures that when directors and executives act self-interestedly in a 
financial sense—when they try to use their corporate powers to line their own pockets—
shareholders can bring derivative suits in which the burden is on the defendant director or execu-
tive to demonstrate the ultimate fairness of his or her actions.”). 
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brings them, the decision to engage in tax avoidance belongs to the board, 
and by extension, to the managers.53 Decisions regarding the structure of 
transactions and financial reporting are effectively within the purview of 
managers.54 Accordingly, managers have the authority to determine whether 
to engage in aggressive tax avoidance because tax avoidance is most often 
an operational decision. 
These managers may engage in tax avoidance because it is in their inter-
est to do so. Managers experience constant pressure to perform and provide 
returns.55 Performance can be demonstrated through increased revenue or 
through decreased costs. Managers who struggle to grow a firm will often 
aggressively manage costs as a mechanism to show performance.56 Engaging 
in tax avoidance is a type of cost management. If tax is a cost of doing busi-
ness, managing that cost will create the appearance of superior perfor-
mance.57 Thus, engaging in tax avoidance is a way for managers to “im-
                                                                                                                           
 53 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2017) (“The business and affairs of every corpora-
tion . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); Nicola Faith 
Sharpe, Process over Structure: An Organizational Behavior Approach to Improving Corporate 
Boards, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 261, 305 (2012) (“The board delegates the majority of this work to the 
top-level managers within the firm. Specifically, overseeing the day-to-day operations of the com-
pany, setting strategy, ensuring firm profitability, and managing employees, are all tasks left to the 
CEO and her closest advisors.”). 
 54 See Blair & Stout, supra note 51, at 282 (“[T]he mediating hierarchy model does not imply 
that directors actually manage the corporation on a day-to-day basis. To the contrary, we expect 
that most corporate decisions are made collegially among team members at lower levels.”); Ira M. 
Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the Large 
Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1283–84 (1998) (“In practice, boards 
have for decades done so by delegating to managers the daily running of the business, giving 
managers the authority to make decisions that incur risks and to respond to changes in the business 
environment, while regularly monitoring management’s performance.”); Sharpe, supra note 53, at 
306 (“While certain indicators of firm success are easily observable (such as stock price), other 
indicators (such as performance evaluations and the viability of strategic plans) are often heavily 
influenced by management’s own views and cannot be independently verified by the board.”). 
 55 See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 
J. CORP. L. 265, 272 (2012) (“[P]ersonal managerial motivations to some degree influenced by a 
firm’s culture explain the desire to meet earnings targets. Managers may lose their jobs, fail to be 
promoted, or find their opportunities to move to other firms impeded by their failure to meet earn-
ings targets.”); Jeong-Bon Kim et al., Corporate Tax Avoidance and Stock Price Crash Risk: 
Firm-Level Analysis, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 639, 639 (2011) (“A wide range of incentives, such as 
compensation contracts, career concerns, and empire building, motivate managers to conceal ad-
verse operating outcomes.”). 
 56 See Alaa M. Ghalayini & James S. Noble, The Changing Basis of Performance Measure-
ment, 16 INT’L J. OPERATIONS & PRODUCTION MGMT. 63, 66 (1996) (“Reducing cost has always 
been considered an effective weapon to achieve competitive advantage.”). 
 57 See Kim et al., supra note 55, at 640 (“Simply put, under the ostensible objective of reduc-
ing a firm’s tax obligations, managers can manipulate earnings and conceal negative firm-specific 
information using tax planning technologies.”). 
2017] Corporate Tax Avoidance and Fiduciary Duties 1439 
prove” their own performance, particularly when they struggle to grow the 
firm.58  
This theory is consistent with accounting literature that has argued that 
tax avoidance is related to managerial rent extraction.59 But a more recent 
paper posits the somewhat more nuanced view that outlying levels of tax 
avoidance are indicative of management monitoring issues.60 In other 
words, managers who engage in aggressive tax avoidance are not being ad-
equately monitored by the board or by stockholders.61 As some scholars 
have suggested, tax avoidance requires a degree of obfuscation, and that 
lack of transparency provides opportunistic managers with cover to enrich 
themselves.62 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Id. 
 59 See Blaylock, supra note 44, at 1014 (“The corporate governance view of tax avoidance of 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Desai et al. (2007) and Desai and Dharmapala (2009a), proposes 
that aggressive forms of tax avoidance, such as tax shelters, use technology complementary to that 
used for managerial rent extraction. According to this theory, managers intentionally obscure the 
reporting of financial performance to make aggressive tax transactions harder for the tax authority 
to detect. However, financial reports are one of shareholders’ key monitoring mechanisms that 
allow them to assess managers’ performance. Obscuring these reports makes it more difficult for 
shareholders to monitor managers, which makes it easier for managers to use firm resources for 
their personal benefit without shareholders’ knowledge.”); Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dhar-
mapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-Powered Incentives, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 145, 147–51 
(2006) (demonstrating the relationship between managerial rent diversion and tax sheltering); 
Mihir A. Desai et al., Theft and Taxes, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 591, 592–601, 618–20 (2007) (discussing 
the relationship between corporate governance and tax enforcement); Mihir Desai & Dhammika 
Dharmapala, Tax and Corporate Governance: An Economic Approach, in TAX AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 14 (Wolfgang Schon ed., 2008) (“The basic intuition for how corporate governance 
and taxation interact is that tax avoidance demands complexity and obfuscation to prevent detec-
tion. These characteristics, in turn, can become a shield for managerial opportunism.”). But see 
Christopher S. Armstrong et al., Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance, 60 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 1, 2 (2015) (“Under our alternative agency-theoretic view, tax avoidance is one of 
many risky investment opportunities available to management. Similar to other investment deci-
sions, unresolved agency problems can lead managers to select a level of tax avoidance that differs 
from what shareholders would prefer. We do not assume that tax avoidance necessarily results in 
opportunities for managerial diversion. Rather, as with other agency problems, we assume that the 
various governance mechanisms in place, including managers’ incentive-compensation contracts, 
can mitigate agency problems with respect to tax avoidance.”). 
 60 See Armstrong et al., supra note 59, at 2 (“Collectively, these findings suggest that more 
financially sophisticated and more independent boards attenuate relatively extreme levels of tax 
avoidance, which are likely to be symptomatic of unresolved agency problems.”). 
 61 See id. (“[B]oard financial expertise and independence both have a negative relation with 
tax avoidance for high levels of the tax avoidance, which is also consistent with over-investment 
in tax avoidance in the absence of monitoring.”). 
 62 See Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Earnings Management, Corporate Tax 
Shelters, and Book—Tax Alignment, 62 NAT’L TAX J. 169, 172 (2009) (“[T]ax avoidance usually 
demands such obfuscation to guarantee the tax benefits. Such obfuscation, however, can simulta-
neously provide a shield for managers engaging in a variety of diversionary activities.”). 
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C. The Negative Externalities of Tax Avoidance 
Providing the appearance of improved financial performance and facil-
itating rent extraction are undoubtedly attractive to managers; however, tax 
avoidance does not create only winners. Tax avoidance creates losers 
through a number of negative externalities. Corporate tax avoidance robs 
the public of revenue to support public goods, including infrastructure, edu-
cation, and national defense.63 Avoidance behavior also undermines a well-
functioning regulatory system.64 Regulatory arbitrage forces a more rigor-
ous and costly monitoring system by undermining shared trust between reg-
ulators and the regulated.65 Tax avoidance also undermines the positive 
business culture needed in an ethical organization.66 Moreover, tax avoid-
ance requires obfuscation, and that behavior can infect the morale, ethics, 
and culture of other parts of the firm.67 
II. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE DODGE MANDATE AND  
THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES MANAGEMENT OWES TO THE  
CORPORATION AND ITS STOCKHOLDERS 
The fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and its stockholders per-
mit, but do not require, that corporate management pursue tax avoidance 
strategies. As held in the classic case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., for-profit 
corporations must be run to produce a profit.68 Although some have taken 
issue with this holding, the fiduciary duties that management owes to the 
corporation and its stockholders support what might appropriately be 
termed the “Dodge mandate.” This mandate suggests that corporate man-
agement may engage in tax avoidance strategies, although how aggressive 
these tax avoidance strategies must be is open to debate.69 
This Part explores the fiduciary duties that corporate management 
owes to the corporation and its stockholders. A brief overview of these fidu-
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Robert Bird & Karie Davis-Nozemack, Tax Avoidance as a Sustainability Problem, J. 
BUS. ETHICS (June 10, 2016) (discussing the effects of tax avoidance on the public commons). 
 64 See id. (noting the link between tax avoidance and the regulatory commons). 
 65 See id. (providing examples of the externalities that tax avoidances visits upon the regulato-
ry commons). 
 66 See id. (noting the relationship among tax avoidance, management integrity, and firm oper-
ation). 
 67 See id. (discussing the effects of tax avoidance on firm culture and ethics). 
 68 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that 
end.”). 
 69 See infra notes 177–228 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations on the Dodge 
mandate and whether there is a requirement that corporate management engage in tax avoidance 
strategies). 
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ciary duties is provided for readers who may not have spent a significant 
amount of time thinking about them.70 Then, an analysis is presented of 
how these duties coalesce into the mandate that the corporation engage in 
profit maximization, or at least make profit seeking the primary corporate 
goal.71 The purpose of this Part is to lay the foundation for discussing why 
corporate management has wide discretion to engage or refrain from engag-
ing, in tax avoidance strategies. 
A. A Brief Overview of the Fiduciary Duties Owed to  
Corporate Stockholders 
Management owes the corporation and its stockholders four major fi-
duciary duties. Although sometimes given different names, these duties for 
purposes of this Article are referred to as the duty of care, the duty of loyal-
ty, the duty of good faith, and the duty of disclosure. Each of these duties is 
examined in turn. 
The duty of care requires that corporate managers reasonably inform 
themselves prior to making business decisions and engage in basic monitor-
ing of the business entity.72 Mere errors in judgment do not constitute a 
breach of the duty of care.73 With the possible exception of waste, which is 
sometimes described as a breach of the substantive duty of care,74 the duty 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See infra notes 72–124 and accompanying text (defining the fiduciary duties corporate 
managers owe to the corporation and its stockholders). 
 71 See infra notes 125–162 and accompanying text (explaining the connection between these 
duties and the Dodge mandate). 
 72 See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 251 
(2009) (“In order to fulfill the ‘duty of care’ directors must only be sure to inform themselves 
regarding business decisions they make on the corporation’s behalf and must exercise the most 
rudimentary monitoring of the corporate enterprise—that is, they must put in place a reporting 
structure that would allow them to find out about significant problems.”); Jorge E. Leal Garrett & 
Bryan A. Green, Considerations for Professional Sports Teams Contemplating Going Public, 31 
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 69, 85 (2010) (“Essentially, the duty of care imposes an obligation on the direc-
tors of the corporation to inform themselves of material information prior to making any deci-
sion.”); Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Ben-
efit Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 38 (2014) (“The duty of care has been 
understood to mainly create a focus on procedure, with the board expected to reasonably inform 
itself before making a decision.”). 
 73 See Leonard M. Baynes, Racial Stereotypes, Broadcast Corporations, and the Business 
Judgment Rule, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 819, 856 (2003) (“Mere errors of judgment and honest mis-
takes are insufficient as grounds for breach of the duty of care.”); Byron F. Egan, Fiduciary Duties 
of Corporate Directors and Officers in Texas, 43 TEX. J. BUS. L. 45, 339 (2009) (“An error in 
judgment does not by itself constitute a breach of the duty of care.”). 
 74 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 781 (2002) (“A board fails to fulfill its ‘substan-
tive due care’ duties by making an irrational decision and thereby committing ‘waste’ or by mak-
ing a ‘gift’ unsupported by any consideration.”); J. Robert Brown, Jr., Speaking with Complete 
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of care is procedural in nature and focuses on how corporate managers un-
dertake their duties.75 To breach this duty, corporate managers must fail to 
inform themselves regarding the material aspects of the corporation and the 
transactions that the corporation undertakes or contemplates undertaking.76 
Smith v. Van Gorkom is one of the seminal cases regarding the duty of 
care.77 In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Chancery and held that members of the board of directors of Trans Union 
Corporation had breached their duty of care by failing to inform themselves 
of the company’s value during a leveraged buyout of Trans Union.78 After 
the board had preliminarily discussed a sale of the company, Trans Union 
president Jerome Van Gorkom met with Jay Pritzker to discuss having one 
of Pritzker’s companies acquire Trans Union. At the meeting, Van Gorkom 
suggested a fifty-five dollars per share sale price, and Pritzker agreed.79 A 
few days later, Van Gorkom presented the idea at a special meeting of Trans 
Union’s board without giving the board sufficient time to study the merger 
                                                                                                                           
Candor: Shareholder Ratification and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 
641, 655 (2003) (“As a practical matter, waste represents a residual claim in duty of care cases, a 
substantive standard available even if the procedural safeguards of the business judgment rule 
have been met.”); McDonnell, supra note 72, at 43 (“The substantive side of the duty of care is 
embodied in the extremely weak waste standard: managers may be held liable for actions which 
are so irrational that they amount to giving away corporate assets.”). 
 75 See Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 761 (2012) 
(“[T]he corporate board’s duty of care is a procedural duty to carefully consider evidence and to 
remain attentive to business realities in making decisions.”); Stephen Ellis et al., A Game Changer 
for the Political Economy of Economic Development Incentives, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 953, 976 (2014) 
(“In the corporate setting, the board of directors is subject to a legal duty of care, which imposes a 
procedural requirement that it asks the right sorts of questions and considers the right sorts of 
information when making decisions.”); Charles R. Korsmo, Lost in Translation: Law, Economics, 
and Subjective Standards of Care in Negligence Law, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 285, 336–37 (2013) 
(“[C]ompliance with the duty of care in corporate law—at least in Delaware—is largely evaluated 
in procedural terms, i.e., did the board employ a thorough procedure?”). 
 76 See Babatunde M. Animashaun, The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties and Liabil-
ities of Corporate Directors, 16 S.U. L. REV. 345, 349 (1989) (“The duty of care requires that 
directors, in the performance of their corporate responsibilities, inform themselves, prior to mak-
ing a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them.”); Phill Kline et 
al., Protecting Charitable Assets in Hospital Conversions: An Important Role for the Attorney 
General, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 360 (2004) (“The duty of care requires corporate direc-
tors to make a reasonable attempt at obtaining all relevant information before taking action.”); 
Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, 
and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 751 (2005) (“The touchstone of the fidu-
ciary duty of care is that prior to pursuing some course of action, the board should be reasonably 
informed, not only by having the relevant information in hand but also by deliberating with appro-
priate care and exchanging views regarding the corporation’s alternatives.”). 
 77 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 78 Id. at 893. 
 79 Id. at 867. 
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agreement.80 After meeting for two hours, the board approved the merger 
without ever analyzing whether fifty-five dollars per share was the proper 
valuation for the company.81 The court held that directors who fail to make 
informed decisions have breached their fiduciary duties under Delaware 
law, and that the Trans Union directors had committed such a breach.82 
As evidenced by Van Gorkom, the extent of the obligations created by 
the duty of care is far from clear. Since Van Gorkom, many states have en-
acted statutes allowing corporations to include provisions in their articles of 
incorporation eliminating liability for breaches of the duty of care.83 Re-
gardless, the duty of care remains one of the four fiduciary duties that man-
agement owes by default in overseeing the corporation. 
Management also owes the corporation and its stockholders a duty of 
loyalty. This duty requires that corporate managers place the interests of the 
corporation and its stockholders ahead of their own.84 It also requires that 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Id. at 868. 
 81 Id. at 869. 
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 83 See Janet E. Kerr, The Financial Meltdown of 2008 and the Government’s Intervention: 
Much Needed Relief or Major Erosion of American Corporate Law? The Continuing Story of 
Bank of America, Citigroup, and General Motors, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 49, 83 (2011) (“Section 
102(b)(7) [of the Delaware General Corporation Law] allows shareholders to adopt a clause in 
their corporation’s articles of incorporation protecting directors from personal liability for mone-
tary damages for breaching the duty of care. Since Delaware enacted section 102(b)(7), all other 
jurisdictions, with the exception of the District of Columbia, have enacted a similar provision.”); 
Sandra K. Miller, The Best of Both Worlds: Default Fiduciary Duties and Contractual Freedom in 
Alternative Business Entities, 39 J. CORP. L. 295, 317 (2014) (“Virtually all states now permit the 
articles of incorporation to eliminate monetary damages for a board member’s breach of the duty 
of care (i.e., gross negligence).”); Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care, 
40 J. CORP. L. 647, 652 (2015) (“Under the laws of most states, director liability for breach of the 
duty of care either is, or can be, limited or even eliminated altogether.”). 
 84 See Norman D. Bishara & Cindy A. Schipani, A Corporate Governance Perspective on the 
Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 303, 316 (2014) (“Although the 
duty of loyalty is not breached when a director or officer profits from a decision that also profits 
the corporation, it requires that directors and officers, when evaluating such decisions, put the 
corporation’s interests above their personal interests.”); Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate 
Law Evolution: A Delaware Judge’s Retrospective, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 141, 145 (2015) 
(“[T]he duty of loyalty, broadly defined, requires directors to avoid positioning themselves so that 
their self-interest conflicts with the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, and 
should any such conflict arise, to place the interests of the corporation and its shareholders ahead 
of any conflicting personal interest.”); Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the 
Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 112 (2006) 
(“As both a decision-maker and a potential beneficiary, the official faces the temptation to enrich 
himself at the expense of the corporation. To protect the corporation and its shareholders against 
such overreaching, the duty of loyalty requires directors to put the corporation’s interests above 
their own at all times.”). 
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managers do not engage in self-dealing.85 As a result, managers are limited 
in their ability to engage in transactions with the corporation and restricted 
in their ability to take advantage of corporate opportunities.86 This duty also 
requires corporate managers to disclose conflicts and to do their best to mit-
igate them.87 
Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. is one of the 
more well-known cases involving a breach of the duty of loyalty.88 In that 
case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed a trial court 
decision holding that William H. Sullivan, Jr., a director and stockholder, 
had committed a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty through an improp-
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Iman Anabtawi, Predatory Management Buyouts, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285, 1290 
(2016) (“Self-dealing offends the very essence of the fiduciary duty of loyalty applicable to corpo-
rate managers.”); Joseph K. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, 86 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 477, 506–07 (2015) (“Self-dealing is a breach of the duty of loyalty unless the transaction 
is objectively fair to the corporation or approved by disinterested and independent directors or 
shareholders in accordance with a statutory ‘safe harbor.’”); John A. Pearce II, The Rights of 
Shareholders in Authorizing Corporate Philanthropy, 60 VILL. L. REV. 251, 270 (2015) (“The 
duty of loyalty requires directors to act on behalf of the corporation and not engage in acts that 
constitute self-dealing or benefiting improperly from their positions, to the detriment of share-
holders.”). 
 86 See Matthew G. Doré, The Duties and Liabilities of an Iowa Corporate Director, 50 
DRAKE L. REV. 207, 243 (2002) (“The duty of loyalty prohibits not only misappropriation of cor-
porate assets, but also more subtle misdeeds, like conflict of interest transactions, competition with 
the corporation, or taking a corporate business opportunity without the corporation’s consent.”); 
Mark Klock, Lighthouse or Hidden Reef? Navigating the Fiduciary Duty of Delaware Corpora-
tions’ Directors in the Wake of Malone, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 13 (2000) (“The duty of loy-
alty involves the directors’ obligation not to put self-interests ahead of corporate interests by en-
gaging in a transaction which benefits the director unfairly at the expense of the corporation or 
taking a corporate opportunity.”); Russell C. Silberglied, Litigating Fiduciary Duty Claims in 
Bankruptcy Court and Beyond: Theory and Practical Considerations in an Evolving Environment, 
10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 181, 185 (2015) (“The duty of loyalty prohibits a corporate director from 
engaging in self-dealing or usurping corporate opportunities in the performance of his or her du-
ties as a director.”). 
 87 See Thomas H. Boyd & Jonathan Haas, The Native American Graves Protection and Re-
patriation Act: Prospects for New Partnerships Between Museums and Native American Groups, 
24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253, 257 (1992) (“The duty of loyalty also requires directors to fully disclose 
opportunities and potential conflicts of interest to allow the board to fairly evaluate the appropriate 
corporate course of action.”); Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate 
Groups: Does Corporate Law Reach Human Rights?, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113, 152 
(2013) (“At base, the duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to act in the best interests of the corpo-
ration without self-dealing and to disclose the nature of any conflict of interest or opportunity that 
may confer a financial benefit upon the fiduciary that is unavailable to other shareholders or to the 
corporation.”); Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, Fiduciary Constraints: Correlating Obliga-
tion with Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697, 717 (2007) (“The duty of loyalty requires that 
corporate interests supersede personal interests, and when conflicts of interest occur, they must 
either be avoided or disclosed and approved by disinterested directors.”). 
 88 492 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986). 
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er freeze-out merger.89 In 1959, Sullivan purchased a professional football 
franchise that would eventually become the New England Patriots.90 The 
ten original investors, including Sullivan, each received 10,000 shares of 
voting stock.91 In July 1960, the corporation issued 120,000 shares of non-
voting stock to the public at a cost of five dollars per share.92 After Sullivan 
was removed as president and lost operating control, he borrowed a signifi-
cant amount of money to obtain control of all 100,000 voting shares.93 As a 
condition of the loans, the lenders required that the income of the corpora-
tion be dedicated to the payment of the loans, and that the assets of the cor-
poration be used to secure the debts.94 To comply with this condition, Sulli-
van needed to eliminate the nonvoting stockholders, which he effected by 
merging the old corporation into a new corporation that he created.95 David 
A. Coggins, a fan of the New England Patriots, sued on behalf of himself 
and other similarly situated stockholders on the ground that the merger was 
legally impermissible.96 
Affirming the trial court, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
held that Sullivan had committed a breach of the duty of loyalty by self-
dealing.97 Writing for the court, Justice Liacos stated, “The freeze-out mer-
ger accomplished by William H. Sullivan, Jr., was designed for his own per-
sonal benefit to eliminate the interests of the Patriots’ minority stockhold-
ers.”98 Justice Liacos continued, “The merger did not further the interests of 
the corporation and therefore was a violation of Sullivan’s fiduciary duty to 
the minority stockholders, and so was impermissible.”99 Notably, the court’s 
holding hinged on the fact that Sullivan’s behavior was not founded upon 
any legitimate business purpose.100 
As Coggins demonstrates, the duty of loyalty is violated when direc-
tors put their own interests ahead of, or otherwise fail to pursue, the inter-
ests of the corporation and its stockholders. This determination is based up-
on whether the director is pursuing business interests of the corporation and 
                                                                                                                           
 89 Id. at 1121–22. 
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 94 Id. at 1114–15. 
 95 Id. at 1115. 
 96 Id. at 1115–16. 
 97 Id. at 1122. 
 98 Id. at 1121–22. 
 99 Id. at 1122; see also Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Sharehold-
er Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 11 (2015) (describing a merger 
involving a controlling shareholder as a classic case of conflict of interest). 
 100 Coggins, 492 N.E.2d at 1119. 
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its stockholders, or whether the director has instead elected to pursue per-
sonal interests. 
In addition to the duties of care and loyalty, management also owes the 
corporation and its stockholders a duty of good faith. Some courts have 
treated this duty as an independent fiduciary duty,101 and other courts, in-
cluding courts in Delaware, have treated the duty of good faith as a part of 
the duty of loyalty.102 The duty of good faith requires that corporate manag-
ers deal honestly and fairly with the corporation and its stockholders.103 
This duty is relatively amorphous and is often used as a gap-filler when no 
other fiduciary duty applies.104 In addition, it is also commonly coupled 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 482 (2004) 
(“[R]ecent cases discussing and expanding the duty of good faith separate it from the duties of 
care and loyalty.”); Luke Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s Challenge for Business 
Entity Law, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511, 538 (2015) (“[M]anagers owe their businesses and 
investors a duty of good faith, which some states include as a separate fiduciary duty and some 
include as a part of the duty of care or loyalty.”). 
 102 See Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control and the Need for Meaningful Board Account-
ability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 541, 545 n.22 (2010) (“[S]ome courts impose a duty of good faith as 
part of the duty of loyalty, rather than as an independent fiduciary duty.”); J. Travis Laster & John 
Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of Blockholder Directors, 70 BUS. LAW. 33, 50 (2014) 
(“Delaware law presumes that directors act loyally and in good faith, which is a subsidiary ele-
ment of the duty of loyalty.”); Rock, supra note 52, at 1960 (“Part of the fiduciary duty of loyalty 
is the duty to act in good faith.”). 
 103 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
1, 5 (2006) (“The duty of good faith in corporate law is comprised of a general baseline concep-
tion . . . [which] consists of four elements: subjective honesty, or sincerity; nonviolation of gener-
ally accepted standards of decency applicable to the conduct of business; nonviolation of generally 
accepted basic corporate norms; and fidelity to office.”); Janet E. Kerr, Developments in Corpo-
rate Governance: The Duty of Good Faith and Its Impact on Director Conduct, 13 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 1037, 1051 (2006) (“[D]espite inconsistency and uncertainty, under the emerging defini-
tion of the duty of good faith, directors may be held personally liable for corporate misbehavior if 
their conduct evidences improper motive or ill will, a reckless disregard of known risks, a sus-
tained failure to oversee management, or is so egregious that it is unexplainable on any other 
grounds other than bad faith.”); Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corpo-
rate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1282 (2010) (“[T]he duty of good faith, which, broadly un-
derstood, is to pursue the interests of the corporation and its shareholders honestly and sincerely, 
and without intentional misconduct of any kind.”). 
 104 See Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good Faith in Director Conduct: Are Dela-
ware Courts Ready to Force Corporate Directors to Go Out-of-Pocket After Disney IV?, 83 
DENV. U. L. REV. 531, 545 (2005) (“Although the Delaware courts frequently mention good faith 
within discussions of the duties of care and loyalty, traditionally the courts have not substantively 
defined the ‘duty’ of good faith. Further clouding the issue, good faith is not defined in the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law . . . .”); Jones, supra note 84, at 113 (“The contours of this duty of 
good faith are ill-defined; nonetheless, some scholars predict that good faith could play a signifi-
cant role in future jurisprudence, representing an independent source of director liability.”); 
Paredes, supra note 76, at 754 n.296 (“Precisely because the content of the duty of good faith is 
uncertain and still unfolding, it can more easily be used as a means of hard-look judicial review, 
unlike the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. In other words, . . . the duty of good faith is malle-
able . . . .”). 
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with claims of breaches of the other fiduciary duties as a means of reinforc-
ing the disdain that courts and society in general feel for breaches of those 
other fiduciary duties.105 
In recent years, the duty of good faith has garnered more attention in 
fiduciary duty litigation, especially in Delaware.106 In re China Agritech, 
Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation is one of the more recent cases.107 In 
that case, stockholders of China Agritech brought a derivative action alleg-
ing various misconduct, including that members of the board had breached 
their duty of good faith.108 In 2008, China Agritech publicly acknowledged 
in documents filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Com-
mission that it was not in compliance with United States financial reporting 
standards because it did not have adequate internal financial controls.109 In 
2010, the company reported a similar deficiency.110 As a result, the compa-
ny hired Ernst & Young Hua Ming as its outside auditor.111 After conducting 
an audit, Ernst & Young sent China Agritech a letter “describing matters 
which, if not appropriately addressed, could result in audit adjustments, sig-
nificant deficiencies or material weaknesses, and delays in the filing of the 
Company’s Form 10-K for 2010.”112 In addition, Lucas McGee, a private 
investor, investigated China Agritech and posted a report declaring the 
company to be a “scam.”113 
As a result, various stockholders brought suit based upon alleged mis-
conduct on the part of the board.114 In ruling on China Agritech’s motion to 
dismiss for failure to make a demand on the board during the course of the 
derivative litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court held that the allegations 
in the complaint regarding the failure to maintain adequate internal controls 
were sufficient to survive the motion because, if proven, the allegations 
would constitute a breach of the duty of good faith.115 The court reached 
this holding because under Delaware law, if a board knows that the compa-
ny’s internal controls and monitoring systems are inadequate to provide ac-
                                                                                                                           
 105 See Eric C. Chaffee, An Interdisciplinary Analysis of the Use of Ethical Intuition in Legal 
Compliance Decisionmaking for Business Entities, 74 MD. L. REV. 497, 525 (2015) (“[B]reaches 
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curate information and yet fails to act, such a failure constitutes a breach of 
the duty of good faith.116 
In re China Agritech, Inc. and similar cases show how malleable the 
duty of good faith can be. In fact, courts in Delaware and other jurisdictions 
have used the duty of good faith to render unlawful behavior that is poten-
tially covered by the duty of care because as previously mentioned, in the 
wake of Van Gorkom, numerous jurisdictions passed statutes that allow cor-
porations to insert provisions in their articles of incorporation eliminating 
liability for breaches of the duty of care.117 China Agritech had such a pro-
vision in its articles of incorporation.118 
Finally, management owes the corporation and its stockholders a duty 
of disclosure. This duty requires that corporate managers disclose to other 
managers and to stockholders various types of material information that are 
relevant to the operation of the company and the activities it undertakes.119 
This duty is often viewed as a subsidiary duty of both the duties of care and 
loyalty.120 Some courts, however, view the duty of disclosure as a separate 
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ing that the board’s fiduciary duty of disclosure, like the board’s duties under Revlon and its prog-
eny, is not an independent duties but the application in a specific context of the board’s fiduciary 
duties of care, good faith, and loyalty.”); see also Carter G. Bishop, Directorial Abdication and 
the Taxonomic Role of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Law, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 905, 927 
(“The Delaware courts have previously determined that the fiduciary duty of disclosure is not an 
independent duty but rather a part of good faith, loyalty, and care.”); Egan, supra note 73, at 52–
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fiduciary duty.121 In addition, significant portions of the duty of disclosure 
have been codified within state and federal securities regulation.122 This is 
especially true with regard to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.123 As the Supreme Court held in SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc., the “fundamental purpose” underlying both the Secu-
rities Act and the Exchange Act is to “substitute a philosophy of full disclo-
sure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard 
of business ethics in the securities industry.”124 As a result, the federal securi-
ties laws are at least in part a statutory embodiment of the duty of disclosure. 
B. Deriving the Dodge Mandate from the Fiduciary Duties Owed to the 
Corporation and Its Stockholders 
As held in the classic case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., “A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stock-
holders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.”125 
This statement, which the authors of this Article refer to as the “Dodge 
mandate,” captures the very essence of a for-profit corporation, which is to 
make a profit.126 Although limitations on this mandate exist, the mandate is 
                                                                                                                           
ware Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 848 (2012) (“Like the duty of good faith, the duty of disclo-
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 123 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp. 
 124 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
 125 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
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(2015) (“By definition, for-profit corporations exist to make money; otherwise they would be non-
profit.”); Carol Goforth, A Corporation Has No Soul, and Doesn't Go to Church: Relating the 
Doctrine of Piercing the Veil to Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 67 S.C. L. REV. 73, 78 (2015) (“The 
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foundational to understanding corporate law as well as understanding how 
corporations approach tax avoidance strategies.127 This Part explores how 
the Dodge mandate emerges from the fiduciary duties owed to the corpora-
tion and its stockholders. 
In Dodge, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that Ford Motor Com-
pany could not operate primarily for the benefit of the public, and so, could 
not employ its wealth principally to benefit society.128 Ford Motor Compa-
ny had become extraordinarily profitable, and as a result, it was retaining an 
enormous amount of money.129 In 1916, Henry Ford, who dominated and 
controlled the company because he owned fifty-eight percent of the com-
mon shares, declared that no future special dividends would be issued.130 
The reasons given for this decision were two-fold. First, Ford claimed that 
he wanted to reduce the price of the cars produced and run the company for 
the benefit of the public. Ford was even quoted in the press in Detroit and 
by news media throughout the United States as stating, “My ambition . . . is 
to employ still more men; to spread the benefits of this industrial system to 
the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their 
homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share of our profits back into 
the business.”131 Second, the retained profits were also to be used to expand 
the existing plant and build an iron smelting plant to allow the company to 
produce its own metal parts.132 John F. Dodge and Horace E. Dodge, who 
were stockholders of the company, objected to these courses of action and 
brought suit.133 
                                                                                                                           
purpose of a for-profit corporation is to run a business and make a profit . . . .”); Daniel J. Morris-
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353, 353 (2015) (“Corporations exist primarily to make profit for their shareholders. This has been 
the black letter rule of law and the reigning orthodoxy of American business for a century.”); 
Christyne J. Vachon, Playing in the Sandbox: Moral Development and the Duty of Care in Col-
laborations Between For-Profit and Nonprofit Corporate Persons, 33 PACE L. REV. 1045, 1067 
(2013) (“[T]he underlying constraint on the for-profit is that law restricts its goal as a cooperative 
enterprise to . . . profit maximization for the benefit of the corporation and its owners.”); see also 
Eric C. Chaffee, Collaboration Theory: A Theory of the Charitable Tax Exempt Nonprofit Corpo-
ration, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1719, 1779 (2016) (explaining that for-profit corporations exist as a 
collaboration in which “[t]he state governments almost invariably will be seeking economic 
growth and innovation while the individuals organizing the corporation will very often be seeking 
to make a profit”). 
 127 See infra notes 177–228 and accompanying text (exploring various limitations on the 
Dodge mandate). 
 128 170 N.W. at 685. 
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The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed in part and reversed in part 
the holding of the lower court that Ford’s actions were impermissible.134 In 
regard to running the company for the public benefit, the court held that this 
management strategy was impermissible because a for-profit corporation 
must be run “primarily for the profit of stockholders.”135 Writing for the ma-
jority, Chief Judge Ostrander stated, “[I]t is not within the lawful powers of a 
board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the 
merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of ben-
efiting others . . . .”136 Simply put, the primary purpose of a for-profit corpo-
ration must be to generate a profit for its stockholders.137 Notably, the Su-
preme Court of Michigan reversed the lower court regarding the retention 
of funds for purposes of expanding the existing plant and building an iron 
smelting plant.138 In doing so, the court acknowledged that judges are not 
“business experts” and held that corporate management must be given def-
erence in making decisions both for immediate profit and long-term compe-
tition.139 
Thus, the Dodge mandate requires that for-profit corporations be run 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The question then becomes how 
this mandate interfaces with the fiduciary duties owed to the corporation 
and its stockholders. Answering this question is important for at least three 
reasons. First, for the Dodge mandate to be correct, it must be justified by 
the fiduciary duties owed by corporate management. Otherwise, the mandate 
should be discarded. Second, understanding how the Dodge mandate emerges 
from these fiduciary duties helps to better understand the requirements of this 
mandate. Third, understanding how the Dodge mandate emerges from these 
fiduciary duties helps to better understand the mandate’s limitations.140 
Of the four fiduciary duties discussed in the previous Section, the duty 
of loyalty is the most important in deriving the Dodge mandate. As dis-
cussed above, this duty requires that corporate managers place the interests 
of the corporation and its stockholders ahead of their own personal inter-
ests.141 The interests of a for-profit corporation are relatively easy to deter-
mine because although modifications can be made in the articles of incorpo-
ration or in various other instances, the reason for the existence of for-profit 
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corporations is to make a profit.142 The interests of the stockholders are 
more complex. One response is that stockholders are also seeking profit 
because otherwise, they would invest and spend their money in other ways. 
For some stockholders, however, this is not the case. For example, in Cog-
gins, one of the reasons, likely the primary reason, why Coggins invested 
was that he wanted to be affiliated with the New England Patriots by own-
ing part of the team.143  
Because investors may have a multitude of reasons for investing in a 
corporation, the issue then becomes which reasons are important for deter-
mining whether stockholders’ interests are being honored for purposes of 
corporate management abiding by its duty of loyalty. In making this deter-
mination, one must remember the contractual nature of investing. By invest-
ing in a for-profit corporation, stockholders have purchased equity in a for-
profit enterprise.144 By virtue of their investment, stockholders have com-
municated their interest in seeking profit to the corporation, and they have 
tacitly agreed with all other stockholders that they will work together to 
seek profit.145 Of course, this agreement may be explicitly altered through 
the initial drafting and subsequent amendment of the articles of incorpora-
tion and bylaws of the corporation, but as a starting point, the interests of 
the stockholder are presumably directed toward the obtainment of profit.146 
Thus, a for-profit corporation exists to make a profit, and a stockholder’s 
assumed primary interest is making a profit. For corporate managers to 
                                                                                                                           
 142 See supra note 126 and accompanying text (explaining the raison d’être of the for-profit 
corporate form). 
 143 See 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1115 (Mass. 1986) (reporting that David A. Coggins was “a fan of 
the Patriots from the time of their formation”). 
 144 See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for 
the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 625 (1999) (“Equity securities have occupied 
the core of corporate and securities law: stocks carry ownership rights . . . .”); Dana Brakman 
Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Financing the Benefit Corporation, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 793, 797 
(2017) (“For incorporated businesses, common stock and corporate bonds are the fundamental 
building blocks of investment capital. Investors who purchase common stock obtain equity—
ultimate ownership of the corporation.”); Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining the Fiduciary 
Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors’ Duties to Creditors, 20 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 113 (1995) (“[S]tockholders own and indirectly manage the corporation 
through equity securities of common stock.”). 
 145 See Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang & Pin-Hsien (Peggy) Lee, Is Moderation the Highest Virtue? 
A Comparative Study of a Middle Way of Control Transaction Regimes, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 
417–18 (2017) (“[C]orporations can be generally understood as profit-seeking entities and that 
shareholders investing in a company generally aim to seek profits, shareholder well-being can be 
simplified into financial interests derived from the company they invest in.”). 
 146 See infra notes 223–228 and accompanying text (explaining that the Dodge mandate can 
be limited through the initial drafting and subsequent amendment of the articles of incorporation 
and bylaws of the corporation). 
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meet their duty of loyalty, profit must be of primary concern and all other 
interests must be secondary, which is in essence the Dodge mandate.147 
What remains is the relationship between the duties of care, good faith, 
and disclosure and the Dodge mandate. The duty of care requires that cor-
porate managers reasonably inform themselves prior to making business 
decisions and engage in basic monitoring of the business entity.148 This duty 
does not require that management always make correct decisions in pursu-
ing profit and fulfilling the Dodge mandate.149 It does, however, require that 
management must reasonably inform themselves of profit-making opportu-
nities and how to mitigate costs.150 As mentioned above, many states have 
allowed this fiduciary duty to be eliminated by including a provision in the 
corporation’s articles of incorporation.151 Even if such a provision is includ-
ed within a corporation’s articles of incorporation, completely ignoring 
profit-making opportunities to pursue other goals or out of sheer laziness is 
likely not permissible as a breach of the duty of loyalty because it would 
signal management putting its own self-interest ahead of the interests of the 
corporation and its stockholders.152 In addition, as also discussed above, the 
duty of good faith now explicitly covers some of the behavior that the duty 
of care renders unlawful.153 
The interaction between the duty of good faith and the Dodge mandate 
is harder to describe with clarity for two reasons. First, the duty of good 
faith has traditionally been malleable and has been used by courts to express 
their dismay with particular behavior.154 As a result, the duty of good faith 
is not a bright-line standard.155 Second, as evidenced by In re China 
Agritech, Inc. and other recent cases, the duty of good faith is evolving.156 
                                                                                                                           
 147 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (providing a summary of the Dodge mandate). 
 148 See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text (analyzing the duty of care). 
 149 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (explaining that mere errors in judgment do not 
constitute a breach of the duty of care). 
 150 See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text (analyzing the duty of care). 
 151 See supra note 83 and accompanying text (explaining that many states have enacted stat-
utes allowing corporations to include provisions in their articles of incorporation eliminating lia-
bility for breaches of the duty of care). 
 152 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (interpreting the duty 
of loyalty to require that the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders outweigh any 
other interest that a director may have). 
 153 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between the duty 
of good faith and the duty of care). 
 154 See supra notes 101–105 and accompanying text (analyzing the duty of good faith). 
 155 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (defining good 
faith in terms of bad faith, but declining to provide an exclusive definition of bad faith on the 
grounds that it was not necessary to do so). 
 156 See 2013 WL 2181514, at *25–26; Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and Monitoring: 
The Standard of Care and the Standard of Liability Post-Enron, 6 WYO. L. REV. 481, 525 (2006) 
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At a minimum, the duty of good faith requires that corporate managers deal 
honestly and fairly with the corporation and its stockholders in pursuing the 
primary purpose of the corporation, namely, seeking profit.157 This require-
ment equates to displaying good faith in undertaking the Dodge mandate. 
Finally, as a result of the duty of disclosure, corporate management al-
so needs to be relatively transparent in undertaking the Dodge mandate.158 
This need for transparency is especially strong considering that portions of 
the duty of disclosure have been codified and bolstered by federal and state 
securities regulation.159 
In sum, the Dodge mandate is founded upon the fiduciary duties that 
corporate managers owe the corporation and its stockholders.160 The duty of 
loyalty specifically requires that the interests of the corporation and its 
stockholders in seeking profit be given primacy above all other interest of 
corporate managers.161 Together, the duties of care, good faith, and disclo-
sure reinforce the Dodge mandate and make it unavoidable. With that said, 
and as will be explored in the next Part, the Dodge mandate is not without 
limitation.162 
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE DODGE MANDATE 
Although Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. remains a seminal case in corpo-
rate law, it is not without its critics.163 Professor Lynn A. Stout, for example, 
has written an essay, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, that ex-
plores a number of reasons why this opinion ought to be discarded in the 
dustbin of history.164 Her reasons include that the case is outdated, the opin-
                                                                                                                           
(“The contours of the duty of good faith, as a fiduciary duty not subsumed within the duty of loy-
alty or the duty of care, are still evolving.”); Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rip-
ples, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 391, 434 (2014) (“A corporate director’s duty of good faith has 
evolved over time to include an obligation to attempt in good faith to assure that an adequate cor-
porate information and reporting system exists.”); Mark J. Loewenstein, The Diverging Meaning 
of Good Faith, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 433, 435 (2009) (“[T]he duty of good faith, which cannot be 
contracted away in any entity, has evolved into a central doctrine, or tool, to police conduct that 
seems to need policing.”). 
 157 See supra notes 101–105 and accompanying text (analyzing the duty of good faith). 
 158 See supra notes 119–124 and accompanying text (analyzing the duty of disclosure). 
 159 See supra notes 122–124 and accompanying text (explaining that portions of the duty of 
disclosure have been codified in federal and state securities law). 
 160 See supra notes 141–159 and accompanying text (deriving the Dodge mandate from the 
fiduciary duties corporate managers owe the corporation and its stockholders). 
 161 See supra note 147 and accompanying text (explaining the duty of loyalty). 
 162 See infra notes 177–228 and accompanying text (offering an overview of possible limita-
tions on the Dodge mandate). 
 163 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 164 Stout, supra note 15. 
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ion was not issued by a leading court, and the Dodge mandate is dicta.165 
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, Professor Stout also argues that 
the corporation is not designed or intended to be an instrument of wealth 
maximization.166 She reaches this conclusion because corporate charters 
and bylaws allow limitations to be placed upon the corporation’s profit-
seeking behavior; state corporate codes do not require corporations to focus 
on wealth maximization; and later case law has evidenced a weakening of 
the Dodge mandate.167 She further argues that economic theory suggests 
that running a corporation to maximize stockholder wealth is inappropriate 
because “economic theory alone does not permit us to safely assume that 
corporations are run best when they are run according to the principle of 
shareholder wealth maximization.”168 
Professor Stout’s essay is well-written and well-reasoned; however, the 
existence of her essay and the arguments contained within it do not under-
cut the importance of this Article for a number of reasons. First, Professor 
Stout’s essay is much more a telling of what the law ought to be, rather than 
what the law is. This Article is primarily designed as a guide to help corpo-
rate managers and those advising them to navigate through the complex 
cluster of issues involving fiduciary duties and corporate tax avoidance is-
sues. Professor Stout herself acknowledges that “[t]he facts underlying 
Dodge v. Ford are familiar to virtually every student who has taken a course 
in corporate law.”169 As a result, the Dodge mandate permeates corporate 
law regardless of whether it ought to have done so. 
Second, even if one adopts a less robust reading of the Dodge mandate 
than Professor Stout, which the authors of this Article do, the interaction 
between this mandate and corporate tax avoidance remains important and 
likely becomes even more complex. The robust reading of Dodge is that it 
demands profit maximization, meaning that corporate management must 
seek the maximum amount of profit available.170 Although the opinion 
might be read this way, the language of the Supreme Court of Michigan 
                                                                                                                           
 165 Id. at 166–68. 
 166 Id. at 168. 
 167 Id. at 168–72. 
 168 Id. at 174. 
 169 Id. at 164. 
 170 A number of commentators have adopted this reading. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 8, 
at 575 (“Dodge’s theory of shareholder wealth maximization has been widely accepted by courts 
over an extended period of time.”); Buccola, supra note 10, at 24 (“The managerial ideal de-
scribed in Dodge and similar cases is that of shareholder-wealth maximization.”); Kent Green-
field, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regu-
latory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 605 (2002) (“Since the early-twentieth century case of 
Dodge v Ford, corporations have been deemed to have an ‘unyielding’ duty to look after the inter-
ests of the shareholders, which has been translated into a duty to maximize profits.”). 
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suggests another interpretation. Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Os-
trander stated, “A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily 
for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end.”171 The fact that a corporation is to be run “primarily 
for the profit of the stockholders” does not mean that corporate managers 
must seek profit maximization.172 It simply means that making a profit must 
be the principal objective, and other secondary objectives might be taken 
into account. The fact that a for-profit entity exists to make a profit is rela-
tively uncontentious.173 Only when one reads Dodge to require profit max-
imization, which is a legitimate reading, does the case become truly contro-
versial. Professor Stout reads Dodge as adopting this aggressive position, 
but the authors of this Article do not.174 
Third, as Professor Stout notes, the Dodge mandate has substantial 
limitations that diminish even the weaker version of that mandate.175 The 
authors of this Article acknowledge and embrace those limitations. The ex-
istence of those limitations and the existence of Professor Stout’s essay in 
general, however, do not undercut the importance of this Article. They both 
simply demonstrate that the Dodge mandate is a lot more complex than it 
facially appears, which reinforces the need for this Article exploring how 
this complex mandate interfaces with tax avoidance.176 
The remainder of this Part explores a number of limitations on the 
Dodge mandate.177 The purpose of this exploration is to lay a foundation for 
explaining the complexities of determining when and how corporate man-
agement must undertake tax avoidance strategies. 
                                                                                                                           
 171 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
 172 See id. 
 173 See supra note 126 and accompanying text (explaining that for-profit corporations exist to 
make a profit). 
 174 See Stout, supra note 15, at 166 (“This Essay argues that Dodge v. Ford is indeed bad law, 
at least when cited for the proposition that the corporate purpose is, or should be, maximizing 
shareholder wealth.”). 
 175 See id. at 170–71 (“In the rare event that . . . a decision is challenged on the grounds that 
the directors failed to look after shareholder interests [based upon the Dodge mandate], courts 
shield directors from liability under the business judgment rule so long as any plausible connec-
tion can be made between the directors’ decision and some possible future benefit, however intan-
gible and unlikely, to shareholders.”). 
 176 See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text (discussing how this article advances the 
existing scholarship). 
 177 See infra notes 178–228 and accompanying text (outlining the limitations on the Dodge 
mandate). 
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A. The Business Judgment Rule and Entire Fairness 
As discussed, the Dodge mandate is derivable from the various fiduci-
ary duties that management owes the corporation and its stockholders, es-
pecially the duty of loyalty.178 As a result, most violations of the Dodge 
mandate are cast as breaches of fiduciary duty.179 In adjudicating whether a 
breach of fiduciary duty has occurred, the business judgment rule grants 
substantial discretion to management in running the corporation.180 There-
fore, the business judgment rule creates a major limitation on the scope of 
the Dodge mandate. 
The business judgment rule, also commonly referred to as the business 
judgment presumption, is the presumption that corporate directors are in-
formed and act in a good faith manner designed to promote the best inter-
ests of the corporation.181 The rule allows directors a considerable amount 
of discretion in managing the corporation,182 and it reflects courts’ aversion 
                                                                                                                           
 178 See supra notes 125–162 and accompanying text (discussing the interaction between the 
Dodge mandate and the fiduciary duties management owes to the corporation and its stockhold-
ers). 
 179 See Julie A. Nelson, Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? Evidence (or Not) from Econom-
ics and Law, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 69, 84 (2011) (“Some argue that directors who fail to 
maximize value for shareholders will commonly face shareholder derivative suits, in which share-
holders bring complaints about management decisions before a court. Fear of such suits is thought 
to goad managers to stay on the narrow path of profit-maximization.”). 
 180 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“The business judgment rule is an 
acknowledgment of the managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors . . . . It is a presumption 
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in 
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see also Andrew S. Gold, Dynamic Fiduciary Duties, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 499 (2012) (“As 
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Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 138 (2016) (“[T]he deference 
provided by courts under the business judgment rule highlights the discretion that corporate man-
agers may have to look beyond shareholder profit.”). 
 181 See Seletha R. Butler, Business Ethics: Conceptualize Governing with the Ethic of Care 
and Justice, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 99, 126–27 (2015) (“The business judgment rule presumes that 
officers and directors make informed and good faith business decisions that are in the best interest 
of the organization unless that plaintiff otherwise can prove the agent committed fraud, acted with 
gross negligence or if self-dealing exists.”); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of 
Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2111 n.163 (2016) (“The business judgment rule is a 
judicial presumption that boards act in good faith, in the best interests of the corporation, and with 
adequate information and deliberation.”); Arthur R. Pinto, Protection of Close Corporation Mi-
nority Shareholders in the United States, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 361, 367 n.40 (2014) (“The business 
judgment rule provides a presumption that in making a decision, directors were informed, acted in 
good faith, and honestly believed that the decision was in the best interests of the corporation.”). 
 182 See Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 688 
(2016) (“The business judgment rule leaves discretion to the board of directors to consider a wide 
range of interests in the management of a corporation . . . .”); David Rosenberg, Goodwill and the 
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to second-guessing corporate management in making business decisions.183 
Courts are willing to show deference in this context because of their as-
sumed limited expertise in business matters and because business decisions 
often involve complex decision making without clear correct answers.184 
The business judgment rule creates a strong presumption in favor of the 
directors that is difficult to overcome for purposes of establishing liabil-
ity.185 The rule and the presumption that it creates can be rebutted based 
                                                                                                                           
Excesses of Corporate Political Spending, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 29, 31 (2015) (“The business 
judgment rule allows corporate directors extremely broad discretion to make decisions on behalf 
of the corporation without fear of personal liability even when those decisions result in losses.”); 
David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 223 (2013) (“Be-
cause of the business judgment rule, directors have near total discretion to run firms the way they 
see fit.”). 
 183 See Justin Blount & Patricia Nunley, Social Enterprise, Corporate Objectives, and the 
Corporate Governance Narrative, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 201, 238 (2015) (“Through the business 
judgment rule, officers and directors can direct the affairs of the corporation the best they are able, 
without the fear that courts will second guess the difficult decisions they must make.”); Joseph 
Mead & Michael Pollack, Courts, Constituencies, and the Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties in the 
Nonprofit Sector, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 303 (2016) (“Under the business judgment rule, a court 
does not second-guess the decision made by a board if the decision could reasonably be thought to 
be in the best interest of the organization and was the product of reasonable attentiveness.”); Paul 
B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 581–82 
(2015) (“The business judgment rule means that courts will refuse to second guess directors’ sub-
stantive business decisions, barring conflicts of interest, corporate waste, or egregious procedural 
impropriety.”). 
 184 See Rachel J. Anderson, Reimagining Human Rights Law: Toward Global Regulation of 
Transnational Corporations, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 183, 197 n.104 (2010) (“The business judg-
ment rule is based on the presumption that directors possess more expertise than judges when it 
comes to making business decisions and so should not be second-guessed by judges as long as 
appropriate procedures have been followed in the decision-making process.”); Kenneth R. Davis, 
Cash of the Titans: Arbitrating Challenges to Executive Compensation, 86 TEMPLE L. REV. 245, 
270 (2014) (“One rationale for the business judgment rule is that judges may lack the expertise to 
evaluate complex business decisions.”); Leahy, supra note 85, at 537–38 (“The business judgment 
rule demands that courts defer to boards’ business expertise because judges (supposedly) are not 
qualified to assess the risks and rewards of a business.”). 
 185 See Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Sanitizing Interested Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 903, 913 (2011) (“Under the business judgment rule, the plaintiffs have the burden to show that 
the defendants did not act in good faith, were not adequately informed, or did not honestly believe 
they were acting in the best interests of the corporation. This burden is extremely hard for plain-
tiffs to overcome; they rarely succeed in cases decided under the business judgment rule.”); Lori 
McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 
521, 529 (2013); (“[I]t is difficult for a plaintiff to rebut the business judgment rule, given that, 
prior to discovery, the information needed might not be readily available.”); Douglas R. Richmond 
et al., Lawyer Liability and the Vortex of Deepening Insolvency, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 127, 153 
(2006) (“The business judgment rule . . . requires plaintiffs to overcome a strong presumption 
against second-guessing the decisions made.”). 
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upon a showing of a breach of the duty of care, loyalty, good faith, or dis-
closure.186 
Still, the discretion granted to corporate managers by the business 
judgment rule is substantial. For example, in Shlensky v. Wrigley, a case 
with similarities to Dodge, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the busi-
ness judgment rule prevented the finding of a breach of fiduciary duty by 
directors absent a showing of “fraud, illegality or conflict of interest.”187 In 
that case, a minority stockholder of the Chicago National League Ball Club 
brought a derivative suit against the members of the board of directors for 
refusing to install lights in Wrigley Field and to schedule night baseball 
games.188 Philip K. Wrigley, who was president of the corporation, domi-
nated the board, and owned eighty percent of its stock, refused to install 
lights and schedule night games because he believed that baseball was a 
“daytime sport” and that the commencing of night games would lead to the 
deterioration of the neighborhood in which the stadium was located.189  
Despite the plaintiff invoking the Dodge mandate, the court refused to 
find a breach of fiduciary duty based upon Wrigley’s and the rest of the di-
rectors’ actions absent a finding of “fraud, illegality or conflict of inter-
est.”190 The court even went so far as to suggest that the decision not to in-
stall lights might be based on “the long run interest of the corporation in its 
property value at Wrigley Field[, which] might demand all efforts to keep 
the neighborhood from deteriorating.”191 Justice Sullivan, writing for the 
court, also stated, “By these thoughts we do not mean to say that we have 
decided that the decision of the directors was a correct one. That is beyond 
our jurisdiction and ability.”192 The court was also troubled by the fact that 
the plaintiff had failed to allege that the installation of lights would have 
actually increased the profitability of the corporation.193 The court conclud-
                                                                                                                           
 186 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 
967, 975 (2009) (“The business judgment rule . . . has no more application to cases involving a 
breach of the duty of care through unconsidered inaction than it does to cases involving breach of 
the duty of loyalty.”); Silberglied, supra note 86, at 186 (“The business judgment rule can be re-
butted by a showing of a breach of the duty of care, loyalty, or good faith.”); Cornelius Wilk, U.S. 
Corporation Going European?—The One-Tier Societas Europaea (SE) in Germany, 35 SUFFOLK 
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 187 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
 188 Id. at 777. 
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ed that “in the absence of a clear showing of dereliction of duty on the part 
of the specific directors,” the business judgment of directors will be re-
spected.194 
Shlensky demonstrates the power of the business judgment rule; with-
out a breach of fiduciary duty, courts will not interfere with the business 
decisions of corporate managers even if they are foolish or ill-conceived.195 
Even in the event that a potential breach of fiduciary duty is shown, corpo-
rate managers can still escape liability by showing the entire fairness, also 
sometimes termed the “intrinsic fairness,” of a transaction.196 Courts ana-
lyze entire fairness as both fairness in terms of price and fairness in terms of 
the dealings surrounding the transaction.197 As a result, while the Dodge 
mandate appears strong, the business judgment rule and the entire fairness 
analysis significantly reduce the force of this mandate. 
The business judgment rule plays a large role in determining when tax 
avoidance is required. For example, a few years ago, news reports surfaced 
in the United Kingdom that Starbucks had been engaging in highly aggres-
sive tax practices while dramatically expanding in the UK market.198 Star-
                                                                                                                           
 194 Id. 
 195 See id. (granting broad deference to the decisions of the board of directors). 
 196 See Lafferty et al., supra note 120, at 842 (“If the business judgment rule is rebutted by 
showing a breach of either the duty of care or the duty of loyalty, the board’s action is reviewed 
using the entire fairness standard, and the directors bear the heavy burden of proving that the chal-
lenged decision or transaction is ‘entirely fair’ to the corporation and its stockholders.”); Nancy R. 
Mansfield et al., The Shocking Impact of Corporate Scandal on Directors’ and Officers’ Liability, 
20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 211, 217 n.20 (2012) (“The plaintiff may rebut the presumption in 
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 197 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (discussing the entire fari-
ness review); Geeyoung Min, The SEC and the Courts’ Cooperative Policing of Related Party 
Transactions, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 663, 688 (“Under entire fairness review, the director-
defendant bears the burden of proving intrinsic fairness both in the process (fair dealing) and in 
the substance (fair price or fair terms) of the transaction at issue. If the director-defendant suc-
ceeds in proving both conditions, the shareholder-plaintiff can neither enjoin the related party 
transaction nor seek any damages.”); Pearce, supra note 85, at 269 (“If the plaintiffs succeed in 
discrediting the [business judgment] presumption, the responsibility shifts to the board to prove 
that the decision to make the donations was entirely fair to the shareholders. The defendant’s need 
to prove entire fairness rests on two elements: fair price and fair dealing.”); Bernard S. Sharfman, 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 
389, 410 (2014) (“[U]nder an entire fairness standard of review the courts allow the board of di-
rectors to meet their burden by showing fair dealing and fair price.”). 
 198 See Kleinbard, supra note 27 (detailing Starbucks’ tax strategies in the United Kingdom); 
Susan C. Morse, The Transfer Pricing Regs Need a Good Edit, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1415, 1438 n.130 
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bucks was, among other things, using shockingly high royalties to a related 
subsidiary with a specially negotiated low tax rate in the Netherlands and 
inter-company loans to strip earnings from its UK-based Starbucks subsidi-
ary.199 The use of these and other tax avoidance mechanisms allowed Star-
bucks to pay a UK tax rate of 0.2% on nearly £3.5 billion in revenue.200 The 
press reports of Starbucks’ tax avoidance caused outrage and public protests 
at its normally serene coffeehouses.201 Ultimately, Starbucks voluntarily 
remitted £20 million in taxes to the UK to sooth public outrage and regain 
its social license to operate.202 
If presented with an opportunity to strip earnings using high royalties 
and intercompany loans in order to claim an artificially low corporate tax 
rate, many would believe that the Dodge mandate requires them to seize 
that opportunity.203 The business judgment rule, however, permits corporate 
managers to decline to engage in such behavior based upon the potential 
consequences. One could reasonably conclude that, if highly aggressive tax 
avoidance techniques are reported widely in the press, consumers may be-
come outraged and protest and boycott, as they did with Starbucks. As a 
result, although the Dodge mandate might appear to suggest that Starbucks’ 
actions were required, the business judgment rule gives corporate managers 
much wider latitude in making tax avoidance decisions, as long as their de-
cisions are motivated by a business purpose. 
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corporation, it behooves the management to try to minimize this cost, or even turn it into a profit. 
Thus, the goal of shareholder profit maximization can naturally lead to corporations trying to 
minimize taxes and thus enhance earnings per share.”); Alexander J. Morgenstern, Note, Corpo-
rate Tax Avoidance: Addressing the Merits of Preventing Multinational Corporations from En-
gaging in the Practice and Repatriating Overseas Profits, 16 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 333, 334 (2017) 
(“Many corporate executives justify corporate participation in tax avoidance as being ‘capitalistic’ 
or encompassed in their fiduciary duties owed to shareholders.”). 
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B. Approval and Ratification 
The scope of the Dodge mandate can also be constrained through the 
use of stockholder and director approval and ratification. When corporate 
management engages in a controversial course of action, one way of help-
ing to insulate those managers from liability is by seeking approval or rati-
fication from either the disinterested stockholders or the disinterested direc-
tors.204 Approval and ratification require full knowledge of all material cir-
cumstances surrounding the act in question.205 
The exact results of approval and ratification in combating a claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty can vary significantly based on the type of act for 
which approval or ratification is sought and upon whether a situation in-
volves stockholder approval, director approval, stockholder ratification, 
director ratification, or some combination of the four.206 If the facts support 
a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, approval and ratification can some-
times restore the business judgment presumption and terminate the litiga-
                                                                                                                           
 204 See Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 763 
(1994) (“[C]orporations law generally permits corporate managers to engage in conflicted deal-
ings if their actions are ratified by a fully informed and disinterested majority of board members or 
shareholders.”); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling 
Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1315–16 (2011) (“[G]enerally, if, after full disclosure, these 
transactions are approved by a majority of disinterested and independent directors or disinterested 
shareholders, the business-judgment rule is reinstated, and the transaction must pass only the (le-
nient) standard of waste. Such approvals are also referred to as ‘cleansing acts.’”); D. Theodore 
Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 703 (2013) (“To take some pressure off 
of courts in evaluating substantive business decisions, corporate law provides two primary safe 
harbor options for cleansing the taint of interested director transactions: (1) approval by a majority 
of the disinterested directors or (2) ratification through a fully informed vote by a majority of the 
disinterested shareholders.”). 
 205 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director’s 
Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1113 (1996) (“[T]he effectiveness of the 
ratification defense depends upon proof that the stockholders were fully informed about what they 
were approving when they approved it. If such proof is not forthcoming, the challenged transac-
tion is examined without the curative or burden-shifting effect of stockholder approval.”); Marcel 
Kahan & Edward Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder: Implications for 
Delaware, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 409, 414 (2010) (reporting that approval and ratification have oc-
curred properly “if the directors are truly independent and function effectively and if shareholders 
receive full disclosure and their vote is uncoerced”); Donna M. Nagy, Owning Stock While Mak-
ing Law: An Agency Problem and a Fiduciary Solution, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567, 575 
(2013) (explaining that in determining whether director or shareholder approval was effective, 
“[t]he scrutiny centers on the nature of the process for approval, with the central focus on whether 
all relevant facts pertaining to the conflict were fully disclosed and whether the directors (or 
shareholders) who approved the transaction were in fact disinterested and acting in good faith”). 
 206 See Mary A. Jacobson, Note, Interested Director Transactions and the (Equivocal) Effects 
of Shareholder Ratification, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 982 (1996) (“Unfortunately, the legal effect 
of ratification is a confusing and unresolved issue in Delaware corporate law.”). 
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tion,207 can sometimes be weighed in the entire fairness analysis in as-
sessing the breach of fiduciary duty,208 can sometimes shift the burden to 
the party asserting the breach to show that the transaction was unfair,209 and 
can sometimes be ignored altogether.210 A complete exploration of how ap-
                                                                                                                           
 207 See Jeffrey J. Hass, Directorial Fiduciary Duties in a Tracking Stock Equity Structure: 
The Need for a Duty of Fairness, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2089, 2160 (1996) (“[I]n a conventional cor-
porate context interested directors must show the entire fairness of dealings between themselves 
and their corporation unless, in accordance with an interested director statute, those dealings have 
been approved or ratified by an informed majority of disinterested directors or stockholders.”); 
Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Audit Committee’s Ethical and Legal Responsibilities: The State Law 
Perspective, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 27, 46 (2005) (“Currently, under Delaware law, a director conflict 
of interest transaction may be substantially immunized from attack on loyalty grounds either by 
taking, usually in advance, certain procedural safeguards—such as making full disclosure of all 
material facts and obtaining independent and disinterested director approval, or obtaining stock-
holder ratification, or by the interested party later proving the entire fairness of the transaction to 
the corporation.”); Andrew F. Tuch, Banker Loyalty in Mergers and Acquisitions, 94 TEX. L. REV. 
1079, 1146 n.358 (2016) (“If a merger has been approved by a fully informed, uncoerced majority 
of the disinterested shareholders, then in a suit for damages, directors’ conduct will be reviewed 
under the deferential business judgment rule rather than under stricter standards.”). 
 208 See Jens Dammann, The Controlling Shareholder’s General Duty of Care: A Dogma That 
Should Be Abandoned, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 479, 504 (“[C]ourts are much stricter when a control-
ling shareholder stands on both sides of the transaction. Here, the general rule is that the transac-
tion remains subject to the entire fairness test even if it has been approved by the shareholders 
and/or the disinterested directors. The most that the controlling shareholder can obtain is a reversal 
in the burden of proof.”). 
 209 See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Government Budgets as the Hunger Games: The Brutal 
Competition for State and Local Government Resources Given Municipal Securities Debt, Pension 
and OBEP Obligations, and Taxpayer Needs, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 663, 768 n.433 (2014) 
(“[T]he Delaware Supreme Court [has] held that, while controlling stockholders can never escape 
entire fairness review, they may shift the burden of persuasion by showing that the transaction was 
approved either by an independent board majority (or in the alternative, a special committee of 
independent directors), or, if certain conditions are met, by an informed vote of the majority of the 
minority shareholders.”); Leahy, supra note 85, at 549 n.309 (“[E]ven if a disinterested and fully 
informed board approves a transaction between the corporation and its controlling shareholder, 
that decision does not automatically receive business judgment rule deference. Rather, the entire 
fairness standard of review applies, with the burden of proof shifted to the plaintiff . . . unless the 
transaction also was approved by a majority of the minority shareholders . . . .”); Benjamin A. 
Templin, The Public Trust in Private Hands: Social Security and the Politics of Government In-
vestment, 96 KY. L.J. 369, 422–23 (2008) (“Ratification of the self-interested transaction by a 
majority of the disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders satisfies the defendant’s bur-
den to prove fairness, though some states provide that even if there is ratification, judicial relief 
will be granted if a plaintiff shows that the transaction was not fair.”). 
 210 See Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities Revisited, 61 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 923, 959 (2013) (“Although approval by disinterested shareholders may be an adequate 
substitute for judicial approval such that the business judgment rule may be invoked, few would 
agree that strict judicial scrutiny for entire fairness should be foreclosed by the affirmative vote of 
interested shareholders.”); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration 
Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 615 (2016) (“Critically, entire-
fairness review may be warranted even when the deal was approved by shareholders upon full 
disclosure of the terms. In other words, because corporate doctrine distrusts shareholders’ ability 
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proval and ratification operate within ligation involving alleged breaches of 
fiduciary duties is beyond the scope of this Article. It is sufficient to note 
that approval and ratification can play a significant role in determining 
whether a breach of fiduciary duty has occurred and how that breach of fi-
duciary duty should be handled. 
Because the Dodge mandate is derived at least in part from the fiduci-
ary duties that corporate managers owe to the business entity, anything that 
helps someone accused of a breach of fiduciary duty serves as a limitation 
upon the Dodge mandate. Put another way, approval and ratification of the 
non-profit-seeking activities of corporate management can render them le-
gally permissible. As a result, approval and ratification serve as additional 
means by which the Dodge mandate may be restricted. 
For instance, application of approval and ratification for the purposes 
of tax avoidance could have manifested itself in the Starbucks incident. Af-
ter enduring public shaming in the press and protests at its stores, Starbucks 
voluntarily remitted a sizable payment to the UK.211 This payment was not 
required by law and could have drawn a legal challenge by stockholders. 
Specifically, the stockholders could have alleged that the voluntary payment 
was tantamount to corporate waste. The managing director of the UK sub-
sidiary could then have used director or stockholder approval or ratification 
to insulate himself and his colleagues from stockholder challenges. 
C. Constituency Statutes 
In many jurisdictions, the business judgment presumption has been 
strengthened, and consequently the Dodge mandate has been weakened, by 
the adoption of corporate constituency statutes.212 A constituency statute 
                                                                                                                           
to bargain on their own behalf, the court retains the right to scuttle a deal that shareholders have 
accepted.”). 
 211 Christians, supra note 202, at 637–39. 
 212 See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 10A-2-11.03(c) (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1202(C), 10-
2702 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1202(c) (2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-106-105(7) (2017); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(g) (West 2017); FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(3) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 14-2-202(b)(5) (West 2017); IDAHO CODE § 30-1702 (2017); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 
(2017); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d) (2017); IOWA CODE § 491.101B (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 271B.12-210(4) (West 2017); ME. STAT. tit. 13-C § 831(6) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, 
§ 65 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(f) (2017); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 351.347(1) (West 2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-815(3) (2017); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 78.138(4) (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:12.02(c) (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14A:6-1(2) (West 2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (West 2017); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW 
§ 717(b) (McKinney 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-03(c) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-
50(6) (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F) (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) 
(2017); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(a) (2017); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (2017); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 33-11-103(c) (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-
 
2017] Corporate Tax Avoidance and Fiduciary Duties 1465 
allows directors to consider other interests beyond those of stockholders, 
such as the interests of creditors, employees, customers, and the public at 
large, when making management decisions for the corporation.213 For ex-
ample, the New York constituency statute provides: 
In taking action, including, without limitation, action which may 
involve or relate to a change or potential change in the control of 
the corporation, a director shall be entitled to consider, without 
limitation, (1) both the long-term and the short-term interests of 
the corporation and its shareholders and (2) the effects that the 
corporation’s actions may have in the short-term or in the long-
term upon any of the following: 
(i) the prospects for potential growth, development,  
productivity and profitability of the corporation; 
 (ii) the corporation’s current employees; 
 (iii) the corporation’s retired employees and other beneficiaries 
 receiving or entitled to receive retirement, welfare or similar
 benefits from or pursuant to any plan sponsored, or agreement 
 entered into, by the corporation; 
 (iv) the corporation’s customers and creditors; and 
                                                                                                                           
103-204 (2017); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.401 (West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-
10a-840(5), 16-10a-1103(3) (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a)(3) (2017); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 13.1-718(B) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.11.030(3) (2017); WIS. STAT. 
§ 180.0827 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2017); see also Christopher Geczy et al., 
Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 95 (2015) 
(“Constituency statutes expand the protection of the business judgment rule by permitting, not 
mandating, directors to consider nonshareholder constituents. In other words, directors would not 
face liability for actions justified, in part, by serving nonshareholder interests.”); Dana Thompson, 
L3CS: An Innovative Choice for Urban Entrepreneurs and Urban Revitalization, 2 AM. U. BUS. 
L. REV. 115, 131 (2012) (“Constituency statutes further solidify the business judgment rule protec-
tions of corporate managers’ decisions that take into account non-shareholder stakeholder interests 
that may conflict with maximizing shareholder profits.”). 
 213 See Rugger Burke & Samuel P. Bragg, Sustainability in the Boardroom: Reconsidering 
Fiduciary Duty Under Revlon in the Wake of Public Benefit Corporation Legislation, 8 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 59, 68 n.34 (2014) (“Constituency statutes, also known as stakeholder statutes, permit a 
board of directors to consider an enumerated list of constituent (i.e., primary stakeholder) interests 
as well as shareholder interests when making business decisions.”); David Groshoff, Contrepre-
neurship? Examining Social Enterprise Legislation’s Feel-Good Governance Giveaways, 16 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 233, 258 (2013) (“Constituency statutes enacted in a majority of states permit—but 
do not mandate—directors to consider non-shareholder interests.”); Tu, supra note 180, at 137–38 
(“In general, constituency statutes allow corporate managers to consider non-shareholder interests 
when determining the best interests of the corporation and protect them from liability for doing 
so.”). 
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 (v) the ability of the corporation to provide, as a going concern, 
 goods, services, employment opportunities and employment 
 benefits and otherwise to contribute to the communities in 
    which it does business.214 
Numerous jurisdictions have adopted similar statutes.215 Notably, Delaware 
has not.216 
Some debate has occurred regarding the proper scope of these statutes 
centering on the purpose that state legislatures originally designed them to 
serve. During the late 1980s, many states adopted these laws to allow cor-
porate management broader discretion in responding to hostile takeovers.217 
                                                                                                                           
 214 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b). 
 215 See James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1596 
(“[O]ver thirty states have passed so-called ‘other constituency’ statutes that expressly permit 
directors to consider the interests of corporate stakeholders other than shareholders . . . .”); Silber-
glied, supra note 86, at 189 (“[T]hirty-two states currently have ‘constituency statutes.’”); Zhong 
Xing Tan, Stewardship in the Interests of Systemic Stakeholders: Re-conceptualizing the Means 
and Ends of Anglo-American Corporate Governance in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis, 9 
J. BUS. & TECH. L. 169, 179 (2014) (“[C]ommentators note the rise of non-shareholder constitu-
ency statutes in at least thirty states, which permit or require directors to consider the impact of 
their decisions on non-shareholding stakeholders.”). 
 216 See William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefin-
ing the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 830–31 (2012) (“Con-
spicuously absent from the list of states adopting constituency statutes is Delaware, where more 
than 900,000 business entities have their legal home, including more than fifty percent of all U.S. 
publicly-traded companies and sixty-three percent of the Fortune 500 companies.”); Robert T. 
Miller, Inefficient Results in the Market for Corporate Control: Highest Bidders, Highest-Value 
Users, and Socially Optimal Owners, 39 J. CORP. L. 71, 122 (2013) (“Some states have so-called 
constituency statutes that authorize (or, in some cases, require) boards to consider the effects of a 
corporate control transaction on parties other than the shareholders of the corporation, but Dela-
ware is not one of these states.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-
Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 780–81 (2015) (“[W]hen other states 
moved to adopt express constituency statutes that allowed their boards of directors to consider the 
interests of other constituencies on an equal footing with stockholders, Delaware did not join 
them . . . .”). 
 217 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Toward a Constitutional Review of the 
Poison Pill, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1563 n.43 (2014) (“[S]tates have adopted ‘constituency’ 
statutes, which allow, or in some cases require, boards of directors to consider the interests of 
constituencies other than shareholders in determining how to respond to a hostile takeover of-
fer.”); McDonnell, supra note 72, at 24–25 (“[I]n the eighties with the growth of first hostile take-
overs and then defenses against such takeovers . . . many states adopted ‘constituency statutes,’ 
which allow boards to consider non-shareholder interests.”); Larry D. Thompson, The Responsible 
Corporation: Its Historical Roots and Continuing Promise, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 199, 216 (2015) (“Corporate discretion to look past the short-term economic interests of 
shareholders and consider additional stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, and the commu-
nity, was expanded in the 1980s when a host of states enacted laws—generally known as ‘constit-
uency statutes’—explicitly authorizing such consideration, largely as a means of enabling local 
companies to fend off unwelcome takeover attempts.”). 
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Some commentators have argued that these constituency statutes should 
therefore be limited to the takeover context, but the plain language of many 
of the statutes, which admittedly does vary, suggests that they apply much 
more broadly.218 Importantly, because of the relative newness of these con-
stituency statutes, their application is a developing and still unsettled area of 
the law.219 Regardless of the uncertainty surrounding the operation of these 
statutes, they limit the Dodge mandate in states that have adopted such laws 
because they allow corporate managers to consider a wider array of inter-
ests beyond the interests of stockholders in profit maximization or at least 
profit seeking. 
Broad constituency statutes could be of particular importance in cases 
of tax avoidance, but narrowly written constituency statutes appear to be of 
lesser to no utility. In the Starbucks example, the relevant constituency stat-
ute would have had no impact on issues of tax avoidance. Starbucks is in-
corporated and headquartered in the state of Washington.220 While Washing-
ton has a constituency statute, the Washington statute is limited to the in-
stance of mergers, meaning that its applicability is relatively narrow. 221 In 
                                                                                                                           
 218 See Barnali Choudhury, Aligning Corporate and Community Interests: From Abominable 
to Symbiotic, 2014 BYU L. REV. 257, 266 (“[S]tate constituency statutes, which enable corporate 
managers to consider non-economic interests when faced with a takeover bid, also permit corpora-
tions to consider community interests.”); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Pub-
lic Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 763 (2005) (“Although these constituency statutes were 
prompted by the 1980s takeover wave, most are not limited to takeovers but rather apply to any 
management decision.”); Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope 
of Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiar-
ies, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409, 464 (2002) (“[D]irectors governed by constituency statutes will 
have wider latitude to make decisions consistent with their mission, regardless of the context.”); 
Virginia Harper Ho, ‘‘Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the 
Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 75 (2010) (“[T]he majority of states (Dela-
ware not included) have adopted constituency statutes, which allow directors to consider the im-
pact of corporate decisions on a broad range of stakeholders—not just on shareholders—and per-
mit decisions ‘in the best interests of the corporation’ even if they are not justified on the basis of 
shareholders’ economic interests.”). 
 219 See Robert M. Ackerman & Lance Cole, Making Corporate Law More Communitarian: A 
Proposed Response to the Roberts Court’s Personification of Corporations, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 
895, 995–96 (2016) (“Constituency statutes are controversial and remain an unsettled area of cor-
porate law . . . .”); Lipton, supra note 210, at 602 n.112 (“Many states have enacted ‘constituency’ 
statutes that permit corporate directors to consider the interests other than stakeholders, although 
directors rarely rely on these statutes when taking action, because their scope and legal effect are 
uncertain.”); Richard B. Tyler, Other Constituency Statutes, 59 MO. L. REV. 373, 400 (1994) 
(“[C]onstituency statutes are ambiguous and so affected with uncertainties as to virtually insure 
that they will wreak more havoc than they can possibly cure.”). 
 220 See Starbucks Corp., Restated Articles of Incorporation (Mar. 25, 2015), http://globalassets.
starbucks.com/assets/6bc40c874ee04752b41b2bd8f729dc1d.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2WC-WDBH]. 
 221 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.11.030(3) (2017) (“The board of directors may condi-
tion its submission of the proposed plan of merger or share exchange on any basis, including the 
affirmative vote of holders of a specified percentage of shares held by any group of shareholders 
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other jurisdictions with broader constituency statutes, the application of 
such laws could dramatically modify the obligations of corporate managers 
to engage in tax avoidance strategies.222 
D. Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws 
Additional limitations on the Dodge mandate can be created through 
the initial drafting and subsequent amendment of the articles of incorpora-
tion and bylaws of the corporation. The default presumption is that individ-
uals invest in for-profit corporations to make a profit.223 The Dodge man-
date is the embodiment of that presumption.224 Through the initial drafting 
and subsequent amendment of the articles of incorporation and bylaws, 
however, this default presumption can be altered.225 If the promoters of a 
corporation or its stockholders wish to seek profit in a certain manner or to 
eschew it in certain instances, both the articles of incorporation and bylaws 
offer a way to achieve this goal. 
Admittedly, using the articles of incorporation and bylaws as a way to 
limit the Dodge mandate is not common. The vast majority of articles of 
incorporation include a provision that the corporation may operate for any 
lawful business purpose as a means of avoiding claims that the business 
entity is engaging in ultra vires activities.226 In addition, the vast majority of 
                                                                                                                           
not otherwise entitled under this title or the articles of incorporation to vote as a separate voting 
group on the proposed plan of merger or share exchange.”). 
 222 Illinois, for example, has adopted a very broad constituency statute that provides: “In dis-
charging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors, committees of the board, 
individual directors and individual officers may, in considering the best long term and short term 
interests of the corporation, consider the effects of any action (including without limitation, action 
which may involve or relate to a change or potential change in control of the corporation) upon 
employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation or its subsidiaries, communities in which 
offices or other establishments of the corporation or its subsidiaries are located, and all other per-
tinent factors.” 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (2017). 
 223 See supra note 126 (explaining that the default presumption is that individuals investing in 
for-profit corporations do so to make a profit). 
 224 See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text (explaining that the Dodge mandate is 
the default presumption that for-profit corporations must be run to make a profit). 
 225 See Shawn Bayern, Contract Meta-Interpretation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1097, 1112 
(2016) (“[T]he Model Business Corporation Act allows directors to take many actions that do not 
directly seek profit, such as aiding scientific progress or making charitable contributions, and in 
general corporate charters may specify or authorize goals beyond simple profit-maximization.”); 
Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: 
Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 282 (2014) 
(“[T]hose who set up the corporation may adopt a charter reflecting shareholder views about what 
business the firm conducts and how to conduct it.”). 
 226 See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1255, 1284 (2008) (“Corporate charters typically describe the purpose of the company as 
anything lawful.”); Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” Corpo-
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individuals and entities invest in for-profit corporations to make a profit,227 
and if they are unhappy with how a corporation is being managed, the indi-
viduals and entities can sell their shares to purchase stock in another com-
pany that better aligns with their objectives.228 Even so, through the initial 
drafting and subsequent amendment of the articles of incorporation and by-
laws of the corporation, stockholders can adjust the metes and bounds of 
when the Dodge mandate applies. 
IV. THE DODGE MANDATE AND CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE 
The Dodge mandate requiring that directors and other corporate man-
agers run the corporation “primarily for the benefit of the stockholders” is 
derived from the fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, good faith, and disclosure. 
As the last Part evidences, this mandate cannot be interpreted in a vacu-
um.229 Indeed, a number of legal limitations on the mandate exist, including 
the business judgment rule, stockholder and director approval and ratifica-
tion, constituency statutes, and the scope and structure of the articles of in-
corporation and bylaws.230 While the intersection of the mandate, fiduciary 
duties, and the aforementioned limitations set the landscape for corporate 
                                                                                                                           
ration, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 595 n.64 (2010) (“For U.S. corporations, the charter (typically 
referred to as the ‘articles of incorporation’ in corporate statutes) represents the core governance 
document, and contains a handful of mandatory items, such as the company’s name and address, 
the nature and purpose of the business (generally phrased to embrace ‘all lawful acts and activi-
ties,’ as permitted by the statute), the authorized stock, and the incorporators.”); Judd F. Sneirson, 
Shareholder Primacy and Corporate Compliance, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 450, 464 (2015) 
(“[T]hose companies that state a corporate purpose in their charters use broad, generic language 
along the lines of ‘the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act.’ As a result, there 
is little unauthorized corporate action left for the ultra vires doctrine to police.”). 
 227 See Thomas K. Cheng, An Economic Analysis of Limited Shareholder Liability in Con-
tractual Claims, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 113, 151 (2014) (“Investors invest to make profit, not to 
minimize losses.”); Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liabil-
ity, Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 159 (1992) (“A shareholder does not 
invest to lose even the initial investment. One invests in the belief that one will derive a profit, 
from appreciation of shares, or from dividends.”). 
 228 See Rave, supra note 204, at 707 (“In the corporate context, if shareholders are unhappy 
with the behavior of management, they can simply sell their shares and exit the agency relation-
ship.”); Robert Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the Business Judgment Rule: 
Arguments for Expanded Corporate Democracy, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 23 (2010) (“If 
shareholders are nevertheless unhappy with decisions made by the board of directors, they have an 
available remedy: sell their shares.”); Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power in 
American Corporations, 71 BUS. LAW. 381, 414 (2016) (“The dominant strategy for shareholders 
unhappy with their managers was the Wall Street Rule to simply sell their stock.”). 
 229 See supra notes 177–228 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Dodge mandate is 
not absolute). 
 230 See supra notes 177–228 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the legal limi-
tations on the Dodge mandate). 
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decision making, the issue that lingers is how to navigate this landscape for 
tax avoidance issues. 
A. The Failure of the Dodge Mandate to Provide Guidance  
in Tax Avoidance Matters 
While directors and corporate managers often look to the Dodge man-
date as a foundational principle defining, shaping, and dictating their fiduci-
ary duties to the corporation and its stockholders, the guidance it offers is 
far from precise because the limitations placed upon the mandate give wide 
discretion in how profit may be sought. Thus, although the Dodge mandate 
remains true in general, it provides little guidance in specific matters, in-
cluding tax avoidance. 
Two recent cases adjudicated in Delaware illustrate this point, and they 
represent a growing body of case law that extends back decades, holding 
that directors and corporate managers have wide discretion in managing the 
firm. In Freedman v. Adams, the Delaware Supreme Court assessed whether 
the choice to engage in a tax avoidance strategy is protected by the business 
judgment presumption.231 In that case, a stockholder alleged that a corporate 
executive bonus plan, which did not meet the requirements of tax deducti-
bility, was tantamount to corporate waste.232 Freedman challenged XTO 
Energy’s payment to its founder and CEO of more than ninety-seven mil-
lion dollars in non-deductible bonus compensation.233 Freedman also chal-
lenged XTO Energy’s non-deductible bonus compensation to other offic-
ers.234 When the bonus plan was adopted, the board knew that the compen-
sation would not be deductible, but the board adopted the plan anyway be-
cause it did not wish to be “constrained” by the limitation of the tax code in 
setting executive compensation.235 The Chancery Court held that the 
board’s actions in adopting the non-deductible bonus plan were protected by 
the business judgment rule.236 
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, holding that 
“[t]he decision to sacrifice some tax savings in order to retain flexibility in 
compensation decisions is a classic exercise of business judgment.”237 The 
Chancery Court’s opinion offered more extensive analysis and explained 
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both its deference and the Delaware Supreme Court’s deference to the 
board’s business judgment: 
Tax strategy is a complex, dynamic area of corporate decision-
making that affects and is affected by many other aspects of a 
company. A company’s tax policy may be implicated in nearly 
every decision it makes, including decisions about its capital 
structure, the legal forms of the various entities that comprise the 
company, which jurisdictions to form these entities in, when to 
purchase capital goods, whether to rent or purchase real property, 
where to locate its operations, and so on. Minimizing taxes can 
also require large expenditures for legal and accounting services 
and may entail some level of legal risk. As such, decisions regard-
ing a company’s tax policy are not well-suited to after-the-fact re-
view by courts and typify an area of corporate decision-making 
best left to management’s business judgment . . . .238 
In short, while the board has an obligation to seek profit, complex areas of 
law are left to the business judgment of the corporation’s directors and other 
managers. 
The Delaware Chancery Court came to a similar conclusion a few 
months later in a case with analogous facts. In Seinfeld v. Slager, the Chan-
cery Court considered whether a director’s failure to minimize taxes violat-
ed that director’s fiduciary duties.239 Seinfeld was a stockholder in Republic 
Services, Inc. and challenged the corporation’s compensation decisions.240 
Seinfeld alleged that a $1.25 million incentive award given to the retiring 
CEO was corporate waste because the payment was not tax deductible.241 In 
analyzing Seinfeld’s contention that “there is an independent duty to mini-
mize taxes, or alternatively that the failure to minimize taxes is per se a 
waste of corporate assets,” the Chancery Court, relying on its decision in 
Freedman,242 declared that “there is no general fiduciary duty to minimize 
taxes.”243 The court left open the theoretical possibility that overpayment 
could result in a breach, but explained that: 
there are a variety of reasons why a company may choose or not 
choose to take advantage of certain tax savings, and generally a 
                                                                                                                           
 238 Freedman, 2012 WL 1345638, at *12. 
 239 Civil Action No. 6462–VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at *1, *3 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012). 
 240 Id. at *3, *7–8. 
 241 Id. at *1. 
 242 2012 WL 1345638, at *12. 
 243 Seinfeld, 2012 WL 2501105 at *3 (quoting Freedman, 2012 WL 1345638, at *12).  
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company’s tax policy “typif[ies] an area of corporate decision-
making best left to management’s business judgment, so long as it 
is exercised in an appropriate fashion.”244 
Once again, while the Dodge mandate may provide a general duty to seek 
profit, it fails to provide an answer to any specific question regarding 
whether to engage in tax avoidance. 
These decisions are, at their core, consistent with the Delaware Su-
preme Court’s broad deference to the business judgment of the board and 
management that stretches back decades. In Paramount Communications v. 
Time, Inc, for example, the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors and 
other corporate managers are afforded wide discretion under the business 
judgment rule with regard to when and how to seek profit.245 In that case, 
the court reviewed efforts to enjoin Time’s tender offer.246 Even though 
Paramount Communications involved a corporate sale, which can invoke a 
stronger duty to maximize stockholder return under the Revlon standard, the 
court refused to require directors to engage in short-term maximization for 
stockholders.247 Rather, the court permitted directors to “chart a course for 
[the] corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed in-
vestment horizon.”248 In its words and actions, the court stated that there is 
no “per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term.”249 Alt-
hough Paramount is over twenty-five years old, Delaware courts continue 
to follow the deferential path it forged. 
Both Freedman and Seinfeld reveal that Delaware courts will not over-
turn tax strategy decisions, even decisions that subject the firm to greater 
tax, under the business judgment rule. One might argue that Delaware 
courts display such significant deference to tax strategy decisions because 
the nature of a tax matter is complex and interrelated to numerous other 
strategic business decisions.250 More likely, however, this show of deference 
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is yet another example demonstrating that it is “not possible or practical for 
courts to discern ex post when a company is maximizing value for share-
holders . . . .”251 Regardless of whether Delaware courts actually show tax-
specific deference, the result is that boards and managers have nearly un-
limited discretion in the setting of tax strategy and that discretion will not—
absent circumstances that have yet to be seen or litigated—subject them to a 
viable claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Both Freedman and Seinfeld were 
decided remarkably close in time and used reasoning and conclusions that 
were in lockstep. There have not been subsequent decisions challenging the 
failure to minimize tax as a breach of fiduciary duty. It is possible, perhaps 
even likely, that these jurisprudential pronouncements were sufficiently 
strong and clear to dissuade other plaintiffs from challenging tax strategy 
decisions as violations of fiduciary duty. 
B. Doctrines Providing Guidance for Corporate Tax Strategy 
As discussed, the Dodge mandate does not provide clear legal guid-
ance in the area of tax avoidance. Further, Delaware courts have not over-
turned tax strategies under the business judgment presumption. Thus, the 
question remains how directors and other corporate managers should ad-
dress tax avoidance decision making. The answer to this question lies in the 
approach that directors and other corporate managers should use when mak-
ing determinations regarding environmental compliance, employment mat-
ters, and numerous other business decisions. When directors and other man-
agers set firm policies and strategies, they should first seek to satisfy legal 
compliance, and then they should analyze whether the firm has social obli-
gations, or can achieve strategic advantages, in going beyond mere legal 
compliance.252 In doing this additional analysis, managers can use doctrines 
and theories from the fields of corporate social responsibility, sustainability, 
and economics to set policy and strategy.253 
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The use of extralegal doctrines and theories in setting policy and strat-
egy is standard operating procedure for many firms in a variety of areas, but 
their use is arguably even more important in setting tax strategies.254 Envi-
ronmental and employment law, for example, set clear minimum legal 
standards.255 In many cases, tax does not provide clear legal standards be-
cause of the relative ease with which firms can adopt tax avoidance strate-
gies.256 Because the initial analysis of tax compliance is often murky, the 
use of established and reliable frameworks for firm decision making be-
comes even more important.257 Without established and reliable frame-
works, managers may be tempted to allow self-interest, personal beliefs, or 
gut instincts to dictate firm tax policy. 
Business scholars have advanced a variety of frameworks to guide 
business decision making beyond mere legal compliance.258 This Article 
focuses on the importance of drawing frameworks from the fields of corpo-
rate social responsibility, sustainability, and economics because frameworks 
from these fields will be especially useful in setting tax policy and strate-
gies. A few words ought to be said about these fields to help illuminate why 
this Article posits that insights from them will be very helpful in determin-
ing tax policy and strategy.  
Corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) is a well-established field that 
offers numerous theories and doctrines to guide directors and other corpo-
rate managers in determining their obligations as to social and ethical con-
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duct.259 CSR recognizes that a firm has fundamental responsibilities to oth-
ers, including its broadly defined stakeholders.260 While CSR is premised 
upon a firm’s responsibilities to others, the doctrines and theories within 
this field permit firms to fulfill their duties to act socially responsible while 
continuing to seek a profit.261  
CSR is often construed to subsume both legal compliance and adher-
ence to ethical norms.262 Uniform agreement among CSR scholars and prac-
titioners as to the ideal balance between profit motive and social responsi-
bility does not exist.263 Although CSR is a well-established field, it remains 
the subject of much scholarly debate because CSR is linked to the intersec-
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tion of complex issues of ethics and economics.264 Still, corporate social 
responsibility generally demands that corporations engage in socially re-
sponsible behavior that promotes the well-being of society.265 In addition, 
even though many aspects of the field are hotly debated, the impact of the 
field can be felt broadly in the behavior of corporations throughout the 
United States.266 Many corporations have explicitly embraced the field, and 
many firms use guidance from the field to assist with managerial decision 
making.267 Large corporations often report their efforts and activities relat-
ing to CSR to their stakeholders.268 
CSR has a significant amount to offer to tax avoidance decision mak-
ing. This field provides various doctrines and theories that can be used for 
setting nearly all firm policies, including tax strategy.269 A small but ex-
panding body of scholarship exists applying the theories and lessons of 
CSR specifically to taxation. The first calls to use CSR to analyze tax strat-
egy were made during the late 1970s, but those calls remained largely unan-
swered until 2006, when Mihir Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala published 
a brief but persuasive article calling for the application of CSR to tax avoid-
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ance.270 Since then, the lion’s share of the work in tax and CSR has been 
published by accountancy scholars.271 Empirical work is beginning to show 
a correlation between a firm’s socially responsible behavior and less aggres-
sive corporate tax strategies.272 While significant work, both theoretical and 
empirical, remains to be done in the area of CSR and tax avoidance, direc-
tors and other managers can look to the field for guidance in determining 
tax policy within their firms.273 
Because of the limited guidance afforded by the Dodge mandate, the 
field of CSR has much to offer corporations in terms of striking the proper 
balance between profit seeking and socially responsible behavior in tax 
compliance decision making. While CSR is premised upon a firm’s respon-
sibilities to others, CSR also allows the firm to balance these responsibili-
ties with its implicit profit motive.274 The exact balance in the area of tax 
avoidance decision making is a complex issue and is beyond the scope of a 
single law review article. At a minimum, however, the fact that a balance is 
needed suggests that the most aggressive tax avoidance strategies should 
not be employed because they avoid a corporation’s responsibility to pay a 
reasonable amount of taxes to the communities from which it derives reve-
nue. 
Sustainability theory offers a second source of guidance in tax avoid-
ance decision making. Sustainability is the management and coordination of 
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financial, social, and environmental resources to ensure sufficiency of those 
resources for current and future needs.275 While most often used when con-
sidering natural resource conservation, sustainability is also a useful theo-
retical construct for considering the sufficiency and use of corporate re-
sources in general. Unlike CSR, which is usually based on duty or responsi-
bility, sustainability is by definition focused on resources.276 Sustainability 
acknowledges the role that people and entities within a community play in 
the protection of resources for current and future use, and it inquires how 
those resources can best be deployed and managed.277 Sustainability is ac-
cepted by numerous corporations around the globe, and public sustainability 
reporting is nearly universally employed by the largest multinational 
firms.278 
Sustainability is an excellent lens for formulating tax strategy because 
it acknowledges and addresses the actual consequences and externalities of 
tax avoidance, namley the erosion of revenue and other social and govern-
mental mechanisms.279 The leading sustainability reporting framework, 
which eighty-two percent of the largest global firms use, has already begun 
to incorporate sustainable tax reporting.280 Full and complete compliance 
with the leading sustainability framework requires firms to report “[a]ll or-
ganization taxes (such as corporate, income, property) and related penalties 
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paid at the international, national, and local levels.”281 The framework also 
requires firms to disclose any tax credits or tax relief from which the firm 
benefits.282 The framework does not require firms to delineate the types, 
recipients, and timing of the taxes paid, which is necessary to determine 
whether a firm’s tax strategy fairly contributes to the communities it im-
pacts.283 Nonetheless, the inclusion of tax into the leading sustainability 
reporting framework guarantees that firms will begin to consider the im-
pacts of their tax strategies, including their tax avoidance. 
Considering the limited guidance afforded by the Dodge mandate, sus-
tainability theory has much to offer directors and other corporate managers 
formulating tax avoidance strategies. Similar to CSR, most conceptions of 
sustainability also likely caution against directors and other corporate man-
agers engaging in extremely aggressive tax avoidance strategies. As this 
Article demonstrates, because of the various limitations on the Dodge man-
date, including the business judgment rule, directors and other corporate 
managers are permitted to take a long-term approach to profitability.284 This 
type of approach is compatible with most conceptions of sustainability. Af-
ter all, most conceptions of sustainability are founded upon the idea of cre-
ating long-term balance, and extreme strategies tend to interfere with that 
balance.285 
In addition to appealing to notions of CSR and sustainability in light of 
the limited guidance afforded by the Dodge mandate, the field of economics 
may also be useful in helping directors and other corporate managers decide 
how to address tax avoidance issues. This observation may seem surprising 
considering that the Dodge mandate is viewed by some as a blatant appeal 
to the idea undergirding a great deal of economic theory that individuals are 
and should be focused on profit and wealth maximization.286 This Article, 
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however, has examined the issue of whether the Dodge mandate creates a 
legal requirement that directors and corporate managers unabashedly en-
gage in wealth maximization and seek profit in all instances. As this Article 
has explained, while the Dodge mandate remains true in general based upon 
the fiduciary duties owed within the firm, the limitations upon the mandate 
give directors and other corporate managers broad discretion in determining 
any specific tax avoidance strategy.287 Just because the Dodge mandate and 
the classical economic theory that underlies it fail to create a legal require-
ment does not mean that the Dodge mandate and this underlying theory 
cannot be used to provide non-legally enforceable guidance. 
Even if directors and other corporate managers look to economic theo-
ry for guidance, this theory does not require that directors and other corpo-
rate managers blindly engage in aggressive tax avoidance strategies. Taking 
such an approach is both simplistic and short-sighted. The American public 
is increasingly concerned about corporations engaging in aggressive tax 
avoidance strategies.288 In non-tax matters, recent cases such as Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc. have increased the scrutiny on corporations.289 As a result, if a corpora-
tion engages in aggressive tax avoidance strategies, it risks drawing the 
condemnation of the public, which may impact the corporation’s business 
prospects, and which also risks additional government scrutiny and poten-
tial litigation. In short, a rational cost-benefit analysis suggests that directors 
and corporate managers should use tax avoidance strategies sparingly to 
prevent the costs and problems associated with their corporation developing 
a reputation as an unscrupulous tax avoider. 
CONCLUSION 
Tax avoidance is a common activity for firms, particularly large firms 
and those with an international presence. Directors and managers often be-
lieve that the Dodge mandate requires them to pursue highly aggressive tax 
avoidance strategies. This Article has shown that belief to be a false prem-
ise. The Dodge mandate, while emerging from the fiduciary duties of loyal-
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ty, care, good faith, and disclosure, is quite limited. Limitations can be 
found in the business judgment rule, stockholder and director approval and 
ratification, constituency statutes, and articles of incorporation and bylaw 
amendments. As demonstrated through Delaware case law, the business 
judgment rule all but eliminates the effect of the Dodge mandate on corpo-
rate tax decisions. Indeed, boards and management have virtual carte 
blanche to set tax strategy, including tax strategies that do not minimize 
taxation. Because the Dodge mandate does not provide definitive guidance 
for tax strategy, directors and management must look outside the law to oth-
er doctrines. The fields of corporate social responsibility, sustainability, and 
economics can all serve as mechanisms to uncover tax strategies that allow 
firms to purse a primary profit motive, while continuing to honor their obli-
gations to stakeholders, and to ensure that the firm and the communities it 
impacts have sufficient resources for the future. 
  
 
